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1970 Election, when election results created a storm and the postponement of inaugural NA session -- Begining of the end of United Pakistan.
Thread:
1970 Election, when election results created a storm and the postponement of inaugural NA session -- Begining of the end of United Pakistan.
Thread:
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The total votes cast in the 1970 election were 34.9 million, out of which 17.1 million were from East Pakistan and 17.7 million were from West Pakistan. 55% and 61% of people cast their votes in the eastern and western halves of the country.
The total votes cast in the 1970 election were 34.9 million, out of which 17.1 million were from East Pakistan and 17.7 million were from West Pakistan. 55% and 61% of people cast their votes in the eastern and western halves of the country.
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Awami League won 160/162 contested seats and won 75.1% of the votes from East Pak. PPP won 81/120 contested from West Pak, PPP obtained 41.6% Punjab, 44.9% Sindh, 14.2 NWFP%, and only 2.3% of votes in Balochistan. AL obtained 0.7% of votes from West Pak.
Awami League won 160/162 contested seats and won 75.1% of the votes from East Pak. PPP won 81/120 contested from West Pak, PPP obtained 41.6% Punjab, 44.9% Sindh, 14.2 NWFP%, and only 2.3% of votes in Balochistan. AL obtained 0.7% of votes from West Pak.
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PPP fell short of 50% votes, gaining only 2% of votes from Balochistan. Bhutto could, therefore, not justifiably claim to be speaking for West Pakistan.
After the election the initial reaction of Yahya was:
"As far as I am concerned my job is finished."
PPP fell short of 50% votes, gaining only 2% of votes from Balochistan. Bhutto could, therefore, not justifiably claim to be speaking for West Pakistan.
After the election the initial reaction of Yahya was:
"As far as I am concerned my job is finished."
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Three days later at Dacca Yahya met Mujib, in the meeting Mujib explained AL's six points and added that while spelling them out in detail during the NA session, he would tone them down sufficiently to ensure that the idea of the unity of the country remains intact.
Three days later at Dacca Yahya met Mujib, in the meeting Mujib explained AL's six points and added that while spelling them out in detail during the NA session, he would tone them down sufficiently to ensure that the idea of the unity of the country remains intact.
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Mujib elaborated upon a few details and said that after the preliminaries of the first session of the assembly, he, as the leader of the majority party, would be called upon to address the house. In his speech, amongst other things, he would eulogize Yahya Khan's..
Mujib elaborated upon a few details and said that after the preliminaries of the first session of the assembly, he, as the leader of the majority party, would be called upon to address the house. In his speech, amongst other things, he would eulogize Yahya Khan's..
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..services to Pakistan, praise his holding of the country's first fair and impartial elections, and propose for him to be the country's first president under the new constitution. The meeting ended on a cordial note and in an airport interview, on Yahya's departure from..
..services to Pakistan, praise his holding of the country's first fair and impartial elections, and propose for him to be the country's first president under the new constitution. The meeting ended on a cordial note and in an airport interview, on Yahya's departure from..
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..Dacca for Islamabad the next day, Yahya told the press that he had a very satisfactory meeting with the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.
Bhutto assumed political control in the West. He was not prepared to sit in the opposition..
..Dacca for Islamabad the next day, Yahya told the press that he had a very satisfactory meeting with the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.
Bhutto assumed political control in the West. He was not prepared to sit in the opposition..
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in a rally in Lahore Bhutto said:
"...no constitution could be made without PPP's cooperation..Punjab and Sindh are centers of power..PPP and AL should share power at the center.."
in a rally in Lahore Bhutto said:
"...no constitution could be made without PPP's cooperation..Punjab and Sindh are centers of power..PPP and AL should share power at the center.."
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He then openly warned Mujib as well as Yahya: “If the People’s Party does not support it, no government will be able to work, nor will the constitution be framed. The Centre needs our co-operation.."
He then openly warned Mujib as well as Yahya: “If the People’s Party does not support it, no government will be able to work, nor will the constitution be framed. The Centre needs our co-operation.."
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The Awami League held their first meeting after the elections on 3rd Jan 1971 at the Dacca racecourse ground. About a million people attended. All MNAs and MPAs took a pledge of loyalty. AL continued to arouse the people to be prepared for greater sacrifices..
The Awami League held their first meeting after the elections on 3rd Jan 1971 at the Dacca racecourse ground. About a million people attended. All MNAs and MPAs took a pledge of loyalty. AL continued to arouse the people to be prepared for greater sacrifices..
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..if the 6 points were not incorporated in the constitution. Mujib saw no reason to strike a deal with Bhutto before taking up the reins he had so clearly won in a free and fair election.
..if the 6 points were not incorporated in the constitution. Mujib saw no reason to strike a deal with Bhutto before taking up the reins he had so clearly won in a free and fair election.
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..Bhutto's lust for power and his determination not to be over-looked made him make statements which increased tension in East Pakistan. Post-election politics became a power struggle between Bhutto and Mujib with the military regime playing the role of an arbitrator.
..Bhutto's lust for power and his determination not to be over-looked made him make statements which increased tension in East Pakistan. Post-election politics became a power struggle between Bhutto and Mujib with the military regime playing the role of an arbitrator.
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However, Mujib's victory was not accepted by many in the military hierarchy including the DG-ISI. According to Maj-Gen Farman, 12 Generals were against handing over of power to Mujib.
On 13th Jan 1971 parleys begin between the govt and the two major political parties in Dacca
However, Mujib's victory was not accepted by many in the military hierarchy including the DG-ISI. According to Maj-Gen Farman, 12 Generals were against handing over of power to Mujib.
On 13th Jan 1971 parleys begin between the govt and the two major political parties in Dacca
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..the AL and PPP. Yahya conceded the technical ability of AL to go it alone. He, however, did express a desire for the AL to include the West Pakistani elements in the future govt. Mujib confirmed to Yahya that he would take persons from both the wings in his cabinet.
..the AL and PPP. Yahya conceded the technical ability of AL to go it alone. He, however, did express a desire for the AL to include the West Pakistani elements in the future govt. Mujib confirmed to Yahya that he would take persons from both the wings in his cabinet.
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Most of the West Pakistani politicians also accepted the fact that AL was competent to frame the constitution including Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan (CML), Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP), A.M Asghar Khan (TIP), G.M Syed (Jiye Sindh) and Akber Bugti.
Most of the West Pakistani politicians also accepted the fact that AL was competent to frame the constitution including Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan (CML), Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP), A.M Asghar Khan (TIP), G.M Syed (Jiye Sindh) and Akber Bugti.
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Mujib made it clear to Yahya that his party had won a clear majority and that it could if it wanted to, produce the new constitution without the support of any other party. It could also form the government relying on its own strength in the assembly.
Mujib made it clear to Yahya that his party had won a clear majority and that it could if it wanted to, produce the new constitution without the support of any other party. It could also form the government relying on its own strength in the assembly.
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Mujib said 6 points are negotiable within reasonable limits they are not the Bible but there should not be a mental block against 6 Points. The other politicians should also be reasonable.
Mujib went on to highlight the significant difference between himself..
Mujib said 6 points are negotiable within reasonable limits they are not the Bible but there should not be a mental block against 6 Points. The other politicians should also be reasonable.
Mujib went on to highlight the significant difference between himself..
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..and Bhutto after the election results:
"I have received information that Bhutto thinks that just as I am here he too has a similar position in West Pakistan. This is not so. I have no rival in East Pakistan. I represent the entire eastern wing. Bhutto cannot say the same..
..and Bhutto after the election results:
"I have received information that Bhutto thinks that just as I am here he too has a similar position in West Pakistan. This is not so. I have no rival in East Pakistan. I represent the entire eastern wing. Bhutto cannot say the same..
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.. about himself in West Pakistan. There are other political parties in the West Wing who have a substantial number of seats who could be included in the future cabinet."
This is what Bhutto feared the most as then he would have been left high and dry.
.. about himself in West Pakistan. There are other political parties in the West Wing who have a substantial number of seats who could be included in the future cabinet."
This is what Bhutto feared the most as then he would have been left high and dry.
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Sitting in the opposition benches was not his cup of tea. Bhutto tried to convey to the AL leader that he had the support of the Army:
"..dont forget I got the highest votes from the cantonments.." reminded Bhutto to barrister Amir-ur-Islam.
Sitting in the opposition benches was not his cup of tea. Bhutto tried to convey to the AL leader that he had the support of the Army:
"..dont forget I got the highest votes from the cantonments.." reminded Bhutto to barrister Amir-ur-Islam.
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The scene then shifted from Dacca to Larkana (not Islamabad as it should have been). Yahya decided to accept Bhutto's invitation to visit Larkana on his way back from Dacca. Yahya was accompanied by General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of staff, and General Peerzada.
The scene then shifted from Dacca to Larkana (not Islamabad as it should have been). Yahya decided to accept Bhutto's invitation to visit Larkana on his way back from Dacca. Yahya was accompanied by General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of staff, and General Peerzada.
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Bhutto spelt out the options available to deal with lopsided election result:
1/ Mujib goes it alone with some elements from the smaller parties in West Pakistan.
2/ Mujib joins hands with him (Bhutto) and they both together form the government.
Bhutto spelt out the options available to deal with lopsided election result:
1/ Mujib goes it alone with some elements from the smaller parties in West Pakistan.
2/ Mujib joins hands with him (Bhutto) and they both together form the government.
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3/ Mujib and Bhutto with the support of Army-run the country. Bhutto called the last option 'the three-legged stool position'.
Yahya reacted sharply to this anomaly. He told Bhutto rather curtly:
"It is not going to be three-legged...I am out of it.."
3/ Mujib and Bhutto with the support of Army-run the country. Bhutto called the last option 'the three-legged stool position'.
Yahya reacted sharply to this anomaly. He told Bhutto rather curtly:
"It is not going to be three-legged...I am out of it.."
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Bhutto them came forward with a direct proposal which he had been hinting at since morning:
"Please tell Mujib that the West Pakistani leadership is in my (Bhutto's) hand and it will be good for the country if he (Mujib), for the sake of the nation, took Bhutto in the govt..
Bhutto them came forward with a direct proposal which he had been hinting at since morning:
"Please tell Mujib that the West Pakistani leadership is in my (Bhutto's) hand and it will be good for the country if he (Mujib), for the sake of the nation, took Bhutto in the govt..
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and that if he does not do so we (Army) will use military force."
Yahya was taken aback. He retorted:
"Zulfi Zulfi mind your words - The army is not going to threaten anyone, nor is it going to plead anyone's case. It is for you to talk to Mujib on all such matters..
and that if he does not do so we (Army) will use military force."
Yahya was taken aback. He retorted:
"Zulfi Zulfi mind your words - The army is not going to threaten anyone, nor is it going to plead anyone's case. It is for you to talk to Mujib on all such matters..
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and for Mujib to take anyone he likes."
The meeting ended with Yahya summing it up by saying "Bhutto you should sort it out with Mujib or else sit in the opposition benches. It will be a strong opposition indeed."
and for Mujib to take anyone he likes."
The meeting ended with Yahya summing it up by saying "Bhutto you should sort it out with Mujib or else sit in the opposition benches. It will be a strong opposition indeed."
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Bhutto's closing remarks to Peerzada on the quiet were "whatever gave you all the idea that I am Banderanaike" (meaning I shall not accept the role of the opposition).
Bhutto subsequently went to Dacca on 27th Jan 1971, during his meeting with Mujib he discussed the 6 Points
Bhutto's closing remarks to Peerzada on the quiet were "whatever gave you all the idea that I am Banderanaike" (meaning I shall not accept the role of the opposition).
Bhutto subsequently went to Dacca on 27th Jan 1971, during his meeting with Mujib he discussed the 6 Points
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Bhutto conceded 5-1/2 out of the 6 Points of Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman. Bhutto in addition to discussing AL's 6 points programme during his meeting with Mujib, talked of 'power-sharing and allocation of portfolios to the PPP'.
Bhutto conceded 5-1/2 out of the 6 Points of Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman. Bhutto in addition to discussing AL's 6 points programme during his meeting with Mujib, talked of 'power-sharing and allocation of portfolios to the PPP'.
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He was wanting to be made the vice President or the foreign minister. If this was promised to Bhutto he would probably have given in on the remaining half-point as well. Mujib had all the cards stacked in his favor.
He was wanting to be made the vice President or the foreign minister. If this was promised to Bhutto he would probably have given in on the remaining half-point as well. Mujib had all the cards stacked in his favor.
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He was in no mood to placate his bitter rival. Bhutto came back, his wishes unfulfilled.
Yahya fixed 3rd March 1970 as the date for the inaugural session of the National assembly of united Pakistan to meet on Wed, March 3, 1971, at 9am in the provincial assembly building..
He was in no mood to placate his bitter rival. Bhutto came back, his wishes unfulfilled.
Yahya fixed 3rd March 1970 as the date for the inaugural session of the National assembly of united Pakistan to meet on Wed, March 3, 1971, at 9am in the provincial assembly building..
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at Dacca for the purpose of framing a constitution of Pakistan. This was a date in-between the dates proposed by Mujib and Bhutto.
Yahya invited Mujib to come to Rawalpindi on Feb 9, 1971, and later again on Feb 17, 1971, but Mujib had declined to do so.
at Dacca for the purpose of framing a constitution of Pakistan. This was a date in-between the dates proposed by Mujib and Bhutto.
Yahya invited Mujib to come to Rawalpindi on Feb 9, 1971, and later again on Feb 17, 1971, but Mujib had declined to do so.
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But little did Yahya know that a storm in a teacup was brewing and that Bhutto was only looking for an excuse to put pressure on Yahya and Mujib to listen to his voice as well.
But little did Yahya know that a storm in a teacup was brewing and that Bhutto was only looking for an excuse to put pressure on Yahya and Mujib to listen to his voice as well.
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On Feb 15, 1971, called Gen Peerzada and said:
"We are elected leaders. The least you could have done was to have consulted us before announcing the date..You will know the consequences when I do no go. My party will not go. I will see how anyone from West Pakistan will go."
On Feb 15, 1971, called Gen Peerzada and said:
"We are elected leaders. The least you could have done was to have consulted us before announcing the date..You will know the consequences when I do no go. My party will not go. I will see how anyone from West Pakistan will go."
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Peerzada duly reported the conversation to Yahya and shocked and angry at the total lack of cooperation by Bhutto.
Bhutto true to his words, threw the bombshell the same night which rocked the boat already in troubled waters.
Peerzada duly reported the conversation to Yahya and shocked and angry at the total lack of cooperation by Bhutto.
Bhutto true to his words, threw the bombshell the same night which rocked the boat already in troubled waters.
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Addressing a public gathering in Peshawar he said:
"PPP will not attend the NA session..we cannot go there only to endorse the constitution already prepared by a party and to return humiliated."
Bhutto had the right to disagree with the proposed constitution..
Addressing a public gathering in Peshawar he said:
"PPP will not attend the NA session..we cannot go there only to endorse the constitution already prepared by a party and to return humiliated."
Bhutto had the right to disagree with the proposed constitution..
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prepared by Awami League *INSIDE* the national assembly. He could have even staged a walkout if the majority party was seen to be bulldozing their way and were indifferent to the interests of the constituency which he was representing.
prepared by Awami League *INSIDE* the national assembly. He could have even staged a walkout if the majority party was seen to be bulldozing their way and were indifferent to the interests of the constituency which he was representing.
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In any case, the President had still the authority not to authenticate the constitution if it violated the ideology of Pakistan and affected the solidarity and territorial integrity of the country.
In any case, the President had still the authority not to authenticate the constitution if it violated the ideology of Pakistan and affected the solidarity and territorial integrity of the country.
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Bhutto muddied the waters further, by his misplaced arrogance when he declared at Karachi that he would break the legs of any of his party members who dared to attend the NA session and those who went without his consent would not be allowed to return.
Bhutto muddied the waters further, by his misplaced arrogance when he declared at Karachi that he would break the legs of any of his party members who dared to attend the NA session and those who went without his consent would not be allowed to return.
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Bhutto threatened "a revolution from Karachi to Khyber". He further angered the AL leadership when he spoke with greater venom:
"Anybody who goes to Dacca from West Pakistan whether in khaki or in black will do so at his own cost..the assembly would be a slaughterhouse."
Bhutto threatened "a revolution from Karachi to Khyber". He further angered the AL leadership when he spoke with greater venom:
"Anybody who goes to Dacca from West Pakistan whether in khaki or in black will do so at his own cost..the assembly would be a slaughterhouse."
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Yahya was aware of the ability of Bhutto to ask people to come out on the streets and create a law and order problem in West Pakistan. He, therefore, decided to speak to Mujib and to try and persuade him to accept a new date.
Yahya was aware of the ability of Bhutto to ask people to come out on the streets and create a law and order problem in West Pakistan. He, therefore, decided to speak to Mujib and to try and persuade him to accept a new date.
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Mujib was requested to come to Rawalpindi and meet Mujib, the AL chief replied:
"I cannot accept a change in the date, I cannot come now. I will come later."
Yahya then requested Admiral Ahsan and a senior Bengali armed forces officer Brigadier Iskender-ul-Karim..
Mujib was requested to come to Rawalpindi and meet Mujib, the AL chief replied:
"I cannot accept a change in the date, I cannot come now. I will come later."
Yahya then requested Admiral Ahsan and a senior Bengali armed forces officer Brigadier Iskender-ul-Karim..
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and three Bengali ministers were sent to Dacca but they too failed to convince Mujib to change his mind. Then on General Farman's insistence, Mujib promised to be in Islamabad on Feb 19, 1971, but when on Feb 18..
and three Bengali ministers were sent to Dacca but they too failed to convince Mujib to change his mind. Then on General Farman's insistence, Mujib promised to be in Islamabad on Feb 19, 1971, but when on Feb 18..
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Bhutto again announced his refusal to go to Dacca saying that there he would be a double hostage, Mujib reneged. Mujib was even on a stronger wicket than Bhutto. He was as much a believer in pressure tactics as his rival in West Pakistan.
Bhutto again announced his refusal to go to Dacca saying that there he would be a double hostage, Mujib reneged. Mujib was even on a stronger wicket than Bhutto. He was as much a believer in pressure tactics as his rival in West Pakistan.
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Yahya was getting more and more upset at the turn of events. On Feb 19, Yahya met Bhutto, by now Yahya had begun to have second thoughts about Mujib's real intentions. It did not need a great deal of effort by Bhutto of painting Mujib as the real villain.
Yahya was getting more and more upset at the turn of events. On Feb 19, Yahya met Bhutto, by now Yahya had begun to have second thoughts about Mujib's real intentions. It did not need a great deal of effort by Bhutto of painting Mujib as the real villain.
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He told Yahya that if he gave in to Mujib West Pakistan would be exploited and there would be no one to look after West Pakistan's interest. Mujib would become a dictator and could manipulate things in favour of East Pakistan alone.
He told Yahya that if he gave in to Mujib West Pakistan would be exploited and there would be no one to look after West Pakistan's interest. Mujib would become a dictator and could manipulate things in favour of East Pakistan alone.
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Yahya was also conscious of the fact that the army, bureaucracy, industrialists, and feudal aristocracy were concentrated in West Pakistan and they not accept the downgrading of their importance by the new set of Bengali legislators.
Yahya was also conscious of the fact that the army, bureaucracy, industrialists, and feudal aristocracy were concentrated in West Pakistan and they not accept the downgrading of their importance by the new set of Bengali legislators.
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Yahya stuck to his guns and did not give any indication to Bhutto that he would postpone the NA session. So Bhutto told the press on Feb 19:
"NA session will take place on the appointed date but without the PPP."
Yahya stuck to his guns and did not give any indication to Bhutto that he would postpone the NA session. So Bhutto told the press on Feb 19:
"NA session will take place on the appointed date but without the PPP."
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To browbeat the govt and Mujib, Bhutto called for a PPP convention at Karachi on Feb 20. AL 6 Points were discussed formally for the first time. Bhutto's main concern was not to allow East Pakistan to dominate over the rest in West Pakistan.
To browbeat the govt and Mujib, Bhutto called for a PPP convention at Karachi on Feb 20. AL 6 Points were discussed formally for the first time. Bhutto's main concern was not to allow East Pakistan to dominate over the rest in West Pakistan.
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Yahya chose to consult his close aides on the next course of action. A meeting of governors and martial law administrators was held on Feb 22, at the President's House in Rawalpindi. Yahya then described very briefly the dilemma he was facing and the crisis..
Yahya chose to consult his close aides on the next course of action. A meeting of governors and martial law administrators was held on Feb 22, at the President's House in Rawalpindi. Yahya then described very briefly the dilemma he was facing and the crisis..
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..that would erupt if the political leaders did not cooperate with each other. He told his intentions to postpone the inaugural session of the NA if major political issues were not resolved between AL and PPP.
..that would erupt if the political leaders did not cooperate with each other. He told his intentions to postpone the inaugural session of the NA if major political issues were not resolved between AL and PPP.
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General Yaqub (Commander of East Command) listened to Yahya's with quiet disdain then elucidated in his accustomed grace & style using all the war course terminology he had mastered over the years & put across his views clearly, candidly and politely: https://twitter.com/umaraqti/status/1156065898370912256?s=20
General Yaqub (Commander of East Command) listened to Yahya's with quiet disdain then elucidated in his accustomed grace & style using all the war course terminology he had mastered over the years & put across his views clearly, candidly and politely: https://twitter.com/umaraqti/status/1156065898370912256?s=20
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Yahya and the rest heard Shahibzada Yaqub's somber reflections in pin-drop silence. All that Yahya could say:
"now let us have dinner. Will see you again tomorrow at 10'clock."
Yahya asked Gen Yaqub and Admiral Ahsan (Governor East Pak) to see Bhutto on their way to East Pak
Yahya and the rest heard Shahibzada Yaqub's somber reflections in pin-drop silence. All that Yahya could say:
"now let us have dinner. Will see you again tomorrow at 10'clock."
Yahya asked Gen Yaqub and Admiral Ahsan (Governor East Pak) to see Bhutto on their way to East Pak
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and persuade him to attend the inaugural session. Ahsan, Yaqub, and Peerzada met Bhutto on Feb 24, Yaqub told Bhutto:
"We do not see any reason for you to boycott the NA session, we have been sent to ask you to attend the session."
and persuade him to attend the inaugural session. Ahsan, Yaqub, and Peerzada met Bhutto on Feb 24, Yaqub told Bhutto:
"We do not see any reason for you to boycott the NA session, we have been sent to ask you to attend the session."
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Bhutto, arrogant and proud as he always was, replied "Instead of telling me tell Mujib to come to West Pakistan."
Yaqub to pacify him said:
"We will speak to him also"..Bhutto replied: "The party is adamant that they will not attend."
Bhutto, arrogant and proud as he always was, replied "Instead of telling me tell Mujib to come to West Pakistan."
Yaqub to pacify him said:
"We will speak to him also"..Bhutto replied: "The party is adamant that they will not attend."
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Yahya had already made known his intentions about postponing the assembly session at the MLAs Conference on Feb 22. In fact, he was contemplating a military crackdown if the reaction to the postponement was violent.
Yahya had already made known his intentions about postponing the assembly session at the MLAs Conference on Feb 22. In fact, he was contemplating a military crackdown if the reaction to the postponement was violent.
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While in Karachi Yahya met Bhutto, who did not take long to tilt Yahya completely towards his way of thinking.
While in Karachi Yahya met Bhutto, who did not take long to tilt Yahya completely towards his way of thinking.
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On Feb 25, Mujib wanted Yahya to visit Dacca and gave a hint that he may modify his 6 Points:
"if federating units of West Pakistan do not wish to have precisely the same degree of autonomy as Bangladesh or wish to secede certain additional power, to the Center..
On Feb 25, Mujib wanted Yahya to visit Dacca and gave a hint that he may modify his 6 Points:
"if federating units of West Pakistan do not wish to have precisely the same degree of autonomy as Bangladesh or wish to secede certain additional power, to the Center..
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..6 Point formula does not stand in their way." said Mujib.
On March 1, 1979, Admiral Ahsan sent for Mujib to convey the decision about the postponement of the NA session. When Gen Yakub and Admiral Ahsan told Mujib, Tajuddin Ahmed (Secretary-general of the AL)..
..6 Point formula does not stand in their way." said Mujib.
On March 1, 1979, Admiral Ahsan sent for Mujib to convey the decision about the postponement of the NA session. When Gen Yakub and Admiral Ahsan told Mujib, Tajuddin Ahmed (Secretary-general of the AL)..
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..and Kamal Hussein. Tajjudin said:
"We knew that West Pakistan will not hand over power."
Mujib took Yakub and Ahsan aside and told them:
"..please get a new date for the session..as he would not be able to control the forces which would be released if that was not done.
..and Kamal Hussein. Tajjudin said:
"We knew that West Pakistan will not hand over power."
Mujib took Yakub and Ahsan aside and told them:
"..please get a new date for the session..as he would not be able to control the forces which would be released if that was not done.
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The picture is now quite clear. The parleys at Larkana have tilted the balance in Bhutto's favor. There will now be a pressing demand by my people for a unilateral declaration of Independence (UDI). After the announcement even if I try not to I will be carried away with..
The picture is now quite clear. The parleys at Larkana have tilted the balance in Bhutto's favor. There will now be a pressing demand by my people for a unilateral declaration of Independence (UDI). After the announcement even if I try not to I will be carried away with..
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the flood..I will still try not to declare the UDI. Please save the situation. If this is done i.e. a new date is given, I would be able to control the situation." was Mujib's final comments.
the flood..I will still try not to declare the UDI. Please save the situation. If this is done i.e. a new date is given, I would be able to control the situation." was Mujib's final comments.
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When they left, Admiral Ahsan sent a telex at CMLA HQs. It stated:
"I beg of you to announce a fresh date tonight, tomorrow will be too late." The plea went unnoticed.
Influenced by Bhutto's arguments at Karachi. Yahya whose mind had already been made up..
When they left, Admiral Ahsan sent a telex at CMLA HQs. It stated:
"I beg of you to announce a fresh date tonight, tomorrow will be too late." The plea went unnoticed.
Influenced by Bhutto's arguments at Karachi. Yahya whose mind had already been made up..
64/
..crossed the rubicon. The message postponing the NA session went on the air at midday March 1, 1971, as planned without giving a fresh date. Yahya took the fatal decision without giving any weightage to the assessment of his top brass in Dacca.
..crossed the rubicon. The message postponing the NA session went on the air at midday March 1, 1971, as planned without giving a fresh date. Yahya took the fatal decision without giving any weightage to the assessment of his top brass in Dacca.
65/
As it turned out later the men on the spot knew the consequences of such a decision better than those sitting 1000 miles away.
** That was the beginning of the end.**
As it turned out later the men on the spot knew the consequences of such a decision better than those sitting 1000 miles away.
** That was the beginning of the end.**
References:
1/ "We've learnt nothing from history" A.M Asghar
2/ "Witness to surrender" Salik
3/ "Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan" Wolpert
4/ "Tragedy of Errors" Matinuddin
1/ "We've learnt nothing from history" A.M Asghar
2/ "Witness to surrender" Salik
3/ "Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan" Wolpert
4/ "Tragedy of Errors" Matinuddin
