Read on Twitter
At least one problem with it, I think, is the competing section 15 argument by members of the same group. A version of which convinced Chief Justice Lamer in Rodriguez. The arg also implies that Carter itself violates s 15 (since it says nothing about foreseeability). https://twitter.com/dtgill/status/1337294644095303680
I am also a bit disturbed by the attempts to harness the impt "choice" framework from Fraser and link it to fundamental life decisiosn so as to *justify* criminal regulation. That seems.....short-sighted.
This will be controversial but....I was really struck by their arg that people experiencing catastrophic injuries suffer terribly for *years* and then eventually get over it and are happy again. That...justifies denying them choice for those years? What about those who never do?
In AC v Manitoba, Justice Binnie pointed out that one of the consequences of a societal commitment to liberty is accepting people's right to make decisions we are think are flatly wrong. That seems squarely on the table here.
In the view of this group, it seems, "autonomy" is a dirty word. I simply can't get behind that kind of approach.
One of the most compelling moments in Carter was when Joe Arvay (representing pltfs) pointed out persons with disabilities have as many perspectives on things as any other group. Thinking of that this week.
There is a totalizing aspect to this argument which is also c concerning. It seems to posit that no one, living with "appropriate supports", would ever choose MAID.
E.g., they have specifically minimized the Truchon/Gladu claims as boiling down to a fear of institutionalization, as opposed to a deeply considered response by those individuals to their own suffering. That seems....disrespectful.
More honest, I think, to simply acknowledge that, on their approach, certain individuals will be relegated to intolerable life, to protect others from wrongful, or symbolically dangerous, death.
