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NEW blog
Professor Robert Hazell sets out how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act can be improved, following the creation of a committee to consider its future @JointCtteeFTPA, and a draft government bill which seeks its repeal.
Summary
https://bit.ly/376zcYx
NEW blog
Professor Robert Hazell sets out how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act can be improved, following the creation of a committee to consider its future @JointCtteeFTPA, and a draft government bill which seeks its repeal.
Summary
https://bit.ly/376zcYx
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What does the draft bill
say?
It would revert to the system before the FTPA, and restore the prerogative power of dissolution. It also contains an ouster clause to make sure that the exercise of the power of dissolution is not open to challenge in the courts.
What does the draft bill
say?It would revert to the system before the FTPA, and restore the prerogative power of dissolution. It also contains an ouster clause to make sure that the exercise of the power of dissolution is not open to challenge in the courts.
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Why repeal?
In the Conservative manifesto, the party stated that the FTPA has “led to paralysis when the country needed decisive action.”
The government wants the executive to be able to call a GE
at a time of its choosing; the FTPA restricts this.
Why repeal?
In the Conservative manifesto, the party stated that the FTPA has “led to paralysis when the country needed decisive action.”
The government wants the executive to be able to call a GE
at a time of its choosing; the FTPA restricts this.
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The Act itself states that the PM should arrange for a committee to review the FTPA before the end of Nov 2020 - it was established last month.
Already, @commonsPACAC & @HLConstitution have conducted reviews, which were discussed at a Unit event.
https://bit.ly/3qLnsCP
The Act itself states that the PM should arrange for a committee to review the FTPA before the end of Nov 2020 - it was established last month.
Already, @commonsPACAC & @HLConstitution have conducted reviews, which were discussed at a Unit event.
https://bit.ly/3qLnsCP
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The report
by @HLConstitution sets out a series of questions about what might replace the FTPA.
Chair of the Lord’s Constitution Committee Baroness (Ann) Taylor summarised the committee’s report on its inquiry in this Unit blog: https://bit.ly/2W5AHjC
The report
by @HLConstitution sets out a series of questions about what might replace the FTPA.Chair of the Lord’s Constitution Committee Baroness (Ann) Taylor summarised the committee’s report on its inquiry in this Unit blog: https://bit.ly/2W5AHjC
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The report by @CommonsPACAC laid out some recommendations which clearly contrast what the government has detailed in its draft bill, such as, granting the HoC the power to set the date of an early general election.
Read the full report here: https://bit.ly/343R0Sq
The report by @CommonsPACAC laid out some recommendations which clearly contrast what the government has detailed in its draft bill, such as, granting the HoC the power to set the date of an early general election.
Read the full report here
: https://bit.ly/343R0Sq
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As consequence, Robert suggests that the PACAC report will have been an uncomfortable read for the government; perhaps it is no surprise that of the 16 MPs selected to join the joint committee, only one is in PACAC
Details of the committee here: https://bit.ly/3qK1bVP
As consequence, Robert suggests that the PACAC report will have been an uncomfortable read for the government; perhaps it is no surprise that of the 16 MPs selected to join the joint committee, only one is in PACAC
Details of the committee here: https://bit.ly/3qK1bVP
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Robert remarks that what is surprising, however, is the government’s decision to run ahead of parliament in already producing its draft bill as this contradicts what is set out in the FTPA: the PM should act following the conclusion of the review by the joint committee.
Robert remarks that what is surprising, however, is the government’s decision to run ahead of parliament in already producing its draft bill as this contradicts what is set out in the FTPA: the PM should act following the conclusion of the review by the joint committee.
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This puts the joint committee in an awkward position.
Nevertheless, the committee should fulfill its statutory duty and carry out a fair-minded review, before deciding whether the Act should be repealed, or merely amended.
This puts the joint committee in an awkward position.
Nevertheless, the committee should fulfill its statutory duty and carry out a fair-minded review, before deciding whether the Act should be repealed, or merely amended.
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Robert lays out a number of questions for the joint committee, such as, should the power to dissolve parliament rest with the executive, or with parliament? If the power is restored to the executive, does that confer an electoral advantage on the incumbent Prime Minister?
Robert lays out a number of questions for the joint committee, such as, should the power to dissolve parliament rest with the executive, or with parliament? If the power is restored to the executive, does that confer an electoral advantage on the incumbent Prime Minister?
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Robert recommends fine-tuning the FTPA, as opposed to repealing it, which would include:
Amending the high threshold for a motion for an early general election from two-thirds to a simple majority.
Robert recommends fine-tuning the FTPA, as opposed to repealing it, which would include:
Amending the high threshold for a motion for an early general election from two-thirds to a simple majority.
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Clarifying the process whereby an alternative government could be formed within 14 days after the House of Commons has passed a formal no-confidence motion.
Clarifying the process whereby an alternative government could be formed within 14 days after the House of Commons has passed a formal no-confidence motion.
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Enabling the House of Commons to determine the date of any early general election, rather than giving that power to the Prime Minister, as currently happens under section 2(7).
Enabling the House of Commons to determine the date of any early general election, rather than giving that power to the Prime Minister, as currently happens under section 2(7).
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Robert sets out his recommendations in full detail in a piece of written evidence he and Professor Meg Russell submitted to PACAC earlier this year.
Read it here: https://bit.ly/2W6RfaN
Robert sets out his recommendations in full detail in a piece of written evidence he and Professor Meg Russell submitted to PACAC earlier this year.
Read it here: https://bit.ly/2W6RfaN
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If the joint committee reviews prorogation Robert writes that it should consider making recommendations to amending the prerogative power of prorogation, so that in future prorogation requires the consent of the House of Commons, and is not simply triggered by the executive.
If the joint committee reviews prorogation Robert writes that it should consider making recommendations to amending the prerogative power of prorogation, so that in future prorogation requires the consent of the House of Commons, and is not simply triggered by the executive.
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Robert concludes: “the stage is set for a classic tussle about the balance of power between the executive and parliament”.
Boris Johnson’s actions so far indicate he has a strong belief that the balance needs to shift in favour of the executive. https://bit.ly/3mhjBKp
Robert concludes: “the stage is set for a classic tussle about the balance of power between the executive and parliament”.
Boris Johnson’s actions so far indicate he has a strong belief that the balance needs to shift in favour of the executive. https://bit.ly/3mhjBKp
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But many in parliament clearly disagree, with growing rebellions over coronavirus legislation, removal of Part 5 of the Internal Market Bill, and frequent defeats in the Lords. https://bit.ly/2W6AMng
But many in parliament clearly disagree, with growing rebellions over coronavirus legislation, removal of Part 5 of the Internal Market Bill, and frequent defeats in the Lords. https://bit.ly/2W6AMng
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Robert concludes by asking, “will the Joint Committee’s report form yet another example of executive overreach being followed by parliamentary pushback, and executive climbdown?”
ENDS
Robert concludes by asking, “will the Joint Committee’s report form yet another example of executive overreach being followed by parliamentary pushback, and executive climbdown?”
ENDS
