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Some further thoughts about philosophical theories of disease:
Even if we concede that we could have a value-free account of disease based on dysfunction (although I don't think we can—I see attribution of function as unavoidably value-laden), there is a further meta-problem. >> https://twitter.com/HaneMaung/status/1335262637567905794
Even if we concede that we could have a value-free account of disease based on dysfunction (although I don't think we can—I see attribution of function as unavoidably value-laden), there is a further meta-problem. >> https://twitter.com/HaneMaung/status/1335262637567905794
>> There are different senses of "disease". One of these senses *is* value-laden. This happens to be the sense of "disease" that is commonly used in clinical practice—healthcare professionals think of disease as a bad thing for someone to have. Now, we could decree that >>
>> there is another sense, disease', based on dysfunction that is value-free. However, this then generates a gap between what is relevant to the everyday practices of healthcare professionals and the theoretical concept of disease'. The challenge then is for the disease' >>
>> theorist to show why healthcare professionals should give up their working concept of disease and instead use the theoretical concept of disease'. This is a big problem—the functions of many of our capacities are uncertain (e.g., mental capacities) and we commonly engage >>
>> in behaviours which would be deemed dysfunctional from an aetiological perspective (e.g., contraception, non-procreative sex, body modification). Also if the theoretical concept of disease' is value-free, then it is unclear why it should have any normative bearing at all on >>
>> clinical practices, which are centred on what is deemed "good" and "bad" for people. One could say that perhaps healthcare should focus on "good" and "bad" instead of health and disease, but that brings into doubt the entire point of proposing a revised concept of disease'.
