79 years ago today, the Japanese sank Prince of Wales and Repulse. It was the first time maneuvering capital ships had been sunk at sea by air power alone. It is often argued that it demonstrated the primacy of air power over the surface fleet, but things weren't so simple.
79 years ago today, the Japanese sank Prince of Wales and Repulse. It was the first time maneuvering capital ships had been sunk at sea by air power alone. It is often argued that it demonstrated the primacy of air power over the surface fleet, but things weren't so simple.
79 years ago today, the Japanese sank Prince of Wales and Repulse. It was the first time maneuvering capital ships had been sunk at sea by air power alone. It is often argued that it demonstrated the primacy of air power over the surface fleet, but things weren't so simple.
79 years ago today, the Japanese sank Prince of Wales and Repulse. It was the first time maneuvering capital ships had been sunk at sea by air power alone. It is often argued that it demonstrated the primacy of air power over the surface fleet, but things weren't so simple.
79 years ago today, the Japanese sank Prince of Wales and Repulse. It was the first time maneuvering capital ships had been sunk at sea by air power alone. It is often argued that it demonstrated the primacy of air power over the surface fleet, but things weren't so simple.
Lt. Iki Haruki, pictured here in the cockpit of a G3M, cast two bouquets of flowers into the ocean over the scene of the engagement. The other two aircraft in his shotai were the only direct Japanese losses in the battle.
Lt. Iki Haruki, pictured here in the cockpit of a G3M, cast two bouquets of flowers into the ocean over the scene of the engagement. The other two aircraft in his shotai were the only direct Japanese losses in the battle.
Lt. Iki Haruki, pictured here in the cockpit of a G3M, cast two bouquets of flowers into the ocean over the scene of the engagement. The other two aircraft in his shotai were the only direct Japanese losses in the battle.
For all the talk about how revolutionary this action was, it didn't demonstrate that much more than people already understood - that air cover for the surface fleet was important. It was also the greatest anti-shipping achievement of the Rikko during the war.
For all the talk about how revolutionary this action was, it didn't demonstrate that much more than people already understood - that air cover for the surface fleet was important. It was also the greatest anti-shipping achievement of the Rikko during the war.
For all the talk about how revolutionary this action was, it didn't demonstrate that much more than people already understood - that air cover for the surface fleet was important. It was also the greatest anti-shipping achievement of the Rikko during the war.
For all the talk about how revolutionary this action was, it didn't demonstrate that much more than people already understood - that air cover for the surface fleet was important. It was also the greatest anti-shipping achievement of the Rikko during the war.
Land-based air power was powerful, but the fights between ships & aviation were more balanced than people assume, with warships often coming out ahead. To the point that the IJNAS deemed daytime anti-shipping attacks against well defend warships suicidal by the end of 1942.
Land-based air power was powerful, but the fights between ships & aviation were more balanced than people assume, with warships often coming out ahead. To the point that the IJNAS deemed daytime anti-shipping attacks against well defend warships suicidal by the end of 1942.
Land-based air power was powerful, but the fights between ships & aviation were more balanced than people assume, with warships often coming out ahead. To the point that the IJNAS deemed daytime anti-shipping attacks against well defend warships suicidal by the end of 1942.
Land-based air power was powerful, but the fights between ships & aviation were more balanced than people assume, with warships often coming out ahead. To the point that the IJNAS deemed daytime anti-shipping attacks against well defend warships suicidal by the end of 1942.
The British were the best positioned of anyone in 1941 to understand the strengths and limitations of land-based air power against shipping, given the nature of the fighting in the Mediterranean. The Royal Navy was anything but out-of-touch with the realities.
The IJN had been at the forefront of developing a large, offensive land-based air arm that could work seamlessly with the fleet in maritime roles. It was an innovation thrust upon it by the naval treaties. They couldn't have more ships, so they turned to land-based air power.
The IJN had been at the forefront of developing a large, offensive land-based air arm that could work seamlessly with the fleet in maritime roles. It was an innovation thrust upon it by the naval treaties. They couldn't have more ships, so they turned to land-based air power.
The IJN had been at the forefront of developing a large, offensive land-based air arm that could work seamlessly with the fleet in maritime roles. It was an innovation thrust upon it by the naval treaties. They couldn't have more ships, so they turned to land-based air power.
The IJN had been at the forefront of developing a large, offensive land-based air arm that could work seamlessly with the fleet in maritime roles. It was an innovation thrust upon it by the naval treaties. They couldn't have more ships, so they turned to land-based air power.
The IJN had been at the forefront of developing a large, offensive land-based air arm that could work seamlessly with the fleet in maritime roles. It was an innovation thrust upon it by the naval treaties. They couldn't have more ships, so they turned to land-based air power.
Inoue Shigeyoshi was the IJN's most prominent exponent of air power. To a radical degree. There is an argument to be made that his almost irrational fear of land-based air power contributed to 4th Fleet's very timid advances through 1941 and early 1942. https://twitter.com/CBI_PTO_History/status/1205001873251434498
I guess my overall point is that while it is attractive to point to a singular event as THE moment people's eyes were opened, it was hardly the case. There was a reason the IJN, RN, and USN had plenty of carriers and air power by 1941, and it wasn't because they were clueless.
As this is a big-picture thread, there is TONS out there to read. The available literature around Force Z and British maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific is varied and large. I want to highlight @ajcboyd's excellent work. I'm still working my way through, but I'm very impressed
The best introduction to the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service is Peattie's _Sunburst_. It is only a brief survey, and has weaknesses, but it is a great starting point. There is a lot more out there past this, but if I were to try and list it all this thread would go on forever.
You can follow @CBI_PTO_History.
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