Ive read the interview with Amb. Jeffrey. The inherent tension is that tethering US presence in Syria to Max Pressure means that the US will also remain tethered to the SDF. The SDF and Turkey are hostile & such a policy will be resisted by Ankara as against its own interests

You — quite simply — cannot have a policy of open-ended presence & find a modus vivendi w/ Ankara. The efforts to do just that — the Manbij Roadmap and the Security Mechanism didnt deter TR action. To the contrary, it was a concession that Ankara pocketed and then upped pressure

The trigger for TR’s invasion wasnt the border force announcement. It was during the security mechanism implementation (which was never fully fleshed out), TR demanded a permanent basing presence. The SDF and the US refused, offering some token compromises that Ankara didnt want

Reis had circled UNGA as the final deadline for the US to capitulate to TR. Once that deadline passed, Ankara invaded. This wasnt a surprise. The US didnt show Turkey teeth. To the contrary, Turkey showed its teeth and we ended up with a Turkish presence and the US pushed out

The threat of sanction, which is included in the ceasefire document, was so watered down and vague (on purpose) as to have no meaning. Turkey, in theory, risks sanctions if it violates the ceasefire, but — meh — how do you define ceasefire violation. This isnt teeth.

This is because there was an acceptance (by some) that Peace Spring could be advantageous to US interests b/c it eliminated the YPG issue and allowed space for the US-TR to align on Assad, ie squaring US-Turkish interests around a perceived shared goal — Ousting Assad

This assumption, of course, ignored how Turkey had enmeshed itself into the Astana process, which contradicts the Geneva Communique, and thereby implicitly aligns Turkish end goals with those of Russia and Iran (even though they are at odds in Idlib).

I keep seeing smart people say that we need to end up in a place of transactionalism w/ Ankara. A transaction implies a business deal, which thereby suggests a mutually agreeable set of deals. Those deals are not happening, precisely because neither side is actually compromising

One cannot begin to overcome tensions in Syria with the Turks if your policy is premised on a close partnership with the SDF. Not possible. You cannot realistically partner with anyone else and stay in Syria, so rapprochement — a transaction — would require changing US presence

Or Ankara changing its own policy on the PKK (not really possible either in this current moment). So, without compromise, you have tension. No transactionalism. Oil and water.

The thing is: The boogeyman CENTCOM was prepared to implement Trump’s orders. It was those that resisted these orders — outside the military — that pushed hardest for an alignment with TR. And yet, their efforts to double down on US presence exacerbated US-TR tensions

These same men also pushed hard to create pathways for the SDF to export oil, legitimizing the resources they would need to fund the project Ankara is so eager to upend. And it was Ankara’s aggressions that brought Russians across the river, giving Moscow leverage over the SDF

You cant really squint at the last 4 years and say there was any coherence to the US position in Syria, and the main pillars of US policy were all holdovers from Obama (2254, D-ISIS, etc).Max Pressure perverted the war, locking in many of its contradictions. <End>