UK & EU currently arguing over mutual ability to levy limited hypothetical penalty tariffs in future if other doesn’t keep up with future increases in standards in workers rights, environment/climate...
If they fail to agree this system, then all tariffs apply instantly...
If they fail to agree this system, then all tariffs apply instantly...
argument is about the relative strength of the disincentive to diverge, not absolute prohibition which wd be clear sovereignty issue. The principle already accepted for current baseline of standards (non-regression).
Seems more a commercial negotiation on terms -more Art of Deal
Seems more a commercial negotiation on terms -more Art of Deal
Perhaps if system incentivising (tho not compelling) keeping up with standards was v strong, it would mean entire FTA was quite fragile, subject to constant penalties...
But if potential hypothetical future penalty tariffs bad...then actual instant ones on everything would be...
But if potential hypothetical future penalty tariffs bad...then actual instant ones on everything would be...
Or put another way, if we can prosper mightily with tariffs on everything instantly, why couldn’t we prosper even more mightily with tariffs only possibly on only somethings at some point in the future?
Blog trying to explain all this.... https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-55249141