Read on Twitter
1/ I think Chinese liberals will never be relevant to the majority of Chinese people
(as for whether that's a good thing or not, I'll leave that up to you)
@timeswang
(as for whether that's a good thing or not, I'll leave that up to you)
@timeswang
2/ Chinese 'liberals' believe (to varying levels) China should allow free speech, press, and religion, multiparty democracy, less military spending, and allowing some level of regional self-determination
https://twitter.com/i/lists/1328314146635407361
https://twitter.com/i/lists/1328314146635407361
3/ These issues do not resonate with the majority of Chinese people. If China had an election today, Chinese 'liberals' would lose in a landslide.
4/ Freedom of speech, press, and the media are viewed as unimportant in the entire Asia-Pacific, not just China.
5/ China is overwhelmingly atheist and religious grievances are not a majority issue.
6/ Support for multiparty democracy has been waning in China since 2008, and has collapsed in the wake of the West's disastrous response to COVID. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-democracy/chinas-response-to-covid-19-better-than-u-s-s-global-poll-finds-idUSKBN23M1LE
7/ Support for the military - and more military spending - is extremely high in China. Informal polling puts it over 70%. The PLA has rebounded from post-89 lows and reinstated itself as a beloved institution in China.
8/ Support for allowing more regional self-determination or favorable policies towards ethnic minorities is overwhelmingly low. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/07/on-uighurs-han-and-general-racial-attitudes-in-china/21137/
9/ With all this in place, you'd think that Chinese 'liberals' would conclude their beliefs aren't resonating and change them, right? Wrong, because their real constituency is not the Chinese people.
10/ Chinese 'liberals' are overwhelmingly employed by Western media, academic, or 'policy research' institutions, or in other cases directly dependent on wealthy Western patrons. Their constituency is the stakeholders within that network. https://twitter.com/qiaocollective/status/1305237583421747200
11/ What do these stakeholders want? Some, like Qualcomm, want to hobble their Chinese competitors. Others, like Raytheon, want a China threat to justify defense budgets. Still others, like Japan's foreign ministry, want China to be contained, defanged, or even balkanized.
12/ For all of these stakeholders, a China that is contained and alienated or even semi-balkanized and with a hobbled military and technology sector - basically, a large version of Yugoslavia - is fantastic.
13/ But that outcome is not so fantastic for the average Chinese person. Their great-grandparents lived through a period of balkanization in the 20s which concluded with 20 million deaths from Imperial Japan's campaign of slaughter and rape.
14/ Hence, the average Chinese person has a subconscious revulsion towards Chinese 'liberals' and the ideas they're peddling. Here are some people who climb the Great Firewall, and the vast majority of them do not get along with these 'liberals' at all.
https://twitter.com/i/lists/1328315373259689985
https://twitter.com/i/lists/1328315373259689985
15/ This is why you get odd hostility from these 'liberals' towards actual Chinese people expressing themselves on Western platforms like Naomi Wu. That's because Chinese 'liberals' only want to *talk about* Chinese people, not sincerely advocate for them...
16/ ...and real Chinese people with real discordant views expose the grift. But does this mean the current policies of the Communist Party of China is the end of political evolution in China? Wrong.
17/ Economically, if you talk to the average youth in China today, they're far more likely to organically appreciate Marxism than they are any sort of 'classical liberal' or postmodern ideology. Economic leftism is alive and well https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1006523/Fed%20Up%20With%20Capitalism,%20Young%20Chinese%20Brush%20Up%20on%20%E2%80%98Das%20Kapital%E2%80%99
18/ Also, housing remains an issue of pressing concern, especially as incomes stagnate in urban areas relative to housing prices while most household savings are locked up in real estate https://www.chinabankingnews.com/2019/07/01/chinas-housing-price-to-income-ratio-hits-9-3-cass-frets-over-economic-impacts
19/ In terms of foreign policy, there is growing emphasis on winning the great-power competition vs the US, coupled with hardening attitudes towards Taiwan (traitors to be dealt with, not compatriots to be won over).
20/ And society itself remains hugely pro-technology, realizing science and tech are critical to winning both economic and foreign policy contests. Elon Musk is probably the most admired American for China in 2020.
21/ Culturally liberal attitudes have proliferated too. China is very likely to pass meaningful LGBT and feminist reform in the next decade, for example. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/17/its-still-just-about-ok-to-be-gay-in-china/
22/ And the military remains a popular topic as always, as the growing community of China military enthusiasts demonstrates.
https://www.cjdby.net/
https://www.cjdby.net/
23/ If someone really wanted to win elections in China, they would advocate higher wages, more housing, a bigger PLA, retaking Taiwan, beating US hegemony, hardcore tech investment, and cultural liberalism.
24/ They wouldn't talk about 'free speech' or whether there are communist symbols in a mosque or give a damn about minorities or lower military spending or relent on Taiwan. Those views wouldn't win votes.
end/ All political ideologies ultimately appeal to two things: the welfare and dignity of the masses. Chinese 'liberals' provide neither, which means they will never be relevant to the China.
But then again, they never cared in the first place.
But then again, they never cared in the first place.
