THREAD: Retired Turkish Admiral Cihat Yayci, often associated with #Turkey's "Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland)" policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, authored an article through the Israeli @dayancenter that warrants some light analysis: https://dayan.org/content/israel-turkeys-neighbor-across-sea-delimitation-maritime-jurisdiction-areas-between-turkey 1/

2/ First, it is noteworthy that a retired senior member of the Turkish armed forces agreed to write in an Israeli publication. Given the circumstances in bilateral ties, any gesture that suggests a willingness to engage in dialogue should be welcomed.

3/ Turkey's efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past year and half generally targeted the interests of other neighboring states (Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and indirectly France).

4/ But not Israel. I've consistently argued: neither ISR nor TR wish to escalate tensions. TR is concerned ISR involvement in EMed affairs will increase the probability of US intervention. ISR wants to maintain channel of dialogue w/TR and avoid entanglement in TR/CY/GR conflict.

5/ This isn't easy to maintain. Erdogan still goes out of his way to take anti-Israel positions (see Hagia Sophia and ISR-UAE normalization statement). And in August, Israel's MFA was compelled to respond to TR NAVTEX in Greek waters and issued a statement in support of Athens.

6/ At the same time, there was tacit cooperation in the Caucasus as both ISR and TR supported Baku in its war in Nagorno-Karabakh. We also have @amberinzaman's latest report that Ankara and Jerusalem are talking to one another: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/turkey-ties-israel-biden-trump-s400-saudi-arabia-erdogan.html

7/ IMHO, the fact that the two sides are in dialogue isn't newsworthy - both Israel and Turkey have maintained inconsistent dialogue on security matters despite the collapse in diplomatic ties. What is newsworthy is that one or both parties want this information reported.

8/ There are, of course, a number of reasons as to why this is the case. The most obvious and predominant is the incoming US administration, but normalization between the Gulf States and Israel, and the possible renegotiating of the Iran Deal are also factors.

9/ Hashing out the multiple issues between Ankara and Jerusalem could be a separate thread. But after providing some context, I wanted to return to Yayci's article in which he proposes a new Eastern Mediterranean alignment between Turkey and Israel.

10/ Yayci opens his case by declaring the proposed EastMed pipeline commercially unfeasible in contrast to a pipeline from Israel to Turkey. He ignores that as late as early 2018, Turkish and Israeli negotiators tried to make an ISR-TR pipeline work, but TR balked over costs.

11/ Yayci then describes the unitization dispute between Israel and Cyprus over the Aphrodite/Yishai field. There is dispute, but Yayci overstates its importance. If Aphrodite field was ever viable for export (separate discussion), the sides would likely reach an agreement.

12/ Finally, we arrive at the meat of Yayci's argument: Cyprus has tricked Israel into accepting a smaller portion of its entitled maritime space according to international law. The solution? Reach a delimitation agreement with Turkey, and expand Israel's maritime space.

13/ There are several obvious challenges to Yayci's proposal, some legal and others political. The legal issue is that Yayci's interpretation of international law limits the rights of Cyprus as an island state in comparison to those of Israel and Turkey.

14/ He offers a number of other international cases (UK-France, 1977; Gulf of Maine, 1984; Libya-Malta, 1984; Nicaragua-Colombia, 2012; Nicaragua-Costa Rica, 2018), but overlooks where those cases don't overlap with the current scenario.

15/ The political issue is that if Israel was to take Yayci's advice, it would be burning a decade's worth of diligent diplomatic and political work to strengthen ties with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, as well as the foundation of the EMGF (Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum).

16/ Unilaterally scrapping its EEZ agreement with Cyprus wouldn't just cost Israel in terms of its regional partnerships, it would have damaging consequences upon its relationship with the European Union. That's a non-starter no matter how bad ties are with Brussels.

17/ Turkey's maritime disputes with Greece and Cyprus can be resolved through direct negotiations (with or without mediation) or through international arbitration. I'd say that Israel's interest in being a party to that conflict (like the Libyan GNA was in Nov 2019) is about 0%.

18/ Yayci's proposal carries significant risks for Israel, yet his piece makes no effort to address the numerous grievances in bilateral relations and the guarantees that Israel no doubt would demand before entertaining something so rash.

19/ In short, Yayci's proposition is off the mark. But it says plenty about the current discourse in Turkey, how Ankara views the role of international maritime law, and how it could theoretically try to drive a wedge between EMGF states.

20/ Yayci's initial position - that Turkey is the logical market for the region's gas - is arguably the right starting point for this conversation, but beyond that his input doesn't move the needle. Hopefully the actual channel of communication is more robust.

22/ Bottom line: Israel and Turkey's future is not contingent on natural gas cooperation, especially if it comes at the cost of Israel's other regional relationships. There are other potential areas of cooperation and other ways to resolve the region's energy gridlock.