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So a few thoughts on @MilHiVisualized's latest vid which touches on Normandy and features Sönke Neitzel discussing his latest book Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik – eine Militärgeschichte. /1
#WW2 #SWW #History
#WW2 #SWW #History
Superficially much of what is said sounds spot on.
A core problem of panoramic strategic history is that you often have to rely on others' work in research. There is simply too much work to do otherwise - this appears to be a tidy microcosm of the problem at hand. /2
A core problem of panoramic strategic history is that you often have to rely on others' work in research. There is simply too much work to do otherwise - this appears to be a tidy microcosm of the problem at hand. /2
As a result small mistakes or misconceptions that underpin influential schools of thought can rapidly corrode grand studies.
For all popular focus, Normandy remains a bit of a historiographic basket case of assumption, confirmation bias, and postwar defence policy. /3
For all popular focus, Normandy remains a bit of a historiographic basket case of assumption, confirmation bias, and postwar defence policy. /3
I've endeavoured to tackle the campaign from a holistic top/down & bottom/up approach, during which it became clear how much of we rely on is crap.
It's also in the peripheries of knowledge that mistakes & misconceptions get disproportionately exaggerated. /4
It's also in the peripheries of knowledge that mistakes & misconceptions get disproportionately exaggerated. /4
Furthermore I have enjoyed Neitzel's previous work.
So to the damned point.
It starts getting a bit iffy when Sönke explicitly suggests Falaise as a failed counter-attack, but in all seriousness on what basis?
Falaise was the result of the Allies harnessing... /5
So to the damned point.
It starts getting a bit iffy when Sönke explicitly suggests Falaise as a failed counter-attack, but in all seriousness on what basis?
Falaise was the result of the Allies harnessing... /5
manoeuvre warfare through deeply adverse terrain in an attempt to run Fifth Panzer Army and Seventh Army to ground.
Mortain causes serious problems but was a very weak endeavour compared to those mounted during Bluecoat/Epsom. Simply put, their panzer divs were bled dry. /6
Mortain causes serious problems but was a very weak endeavour compared to those mounted during Bluecoat/Epsom. Simply put, their panzer divs were bled dry. /6
This strikes me as a core misunderstanding of the Normandy campaign. Similarly it is undeniable that the Germans did manage to successfully hold Second Army during Epsom with the arrival of II SS-Pzkps and prevent an even greater immediate catastrophe. /7
Allied artillery is repeatedly used as, frankly, an excuse by German forces in Normandy, a bit like air power, to deflect from serious tactical failings.
This is where deeply flawed campaign study sees otherwise comfortable broader narratives destabilise. /8
This is where deeply flawed campaign study sees otherwise comfortable broader narratives destabilise. /8
German comments on harassing fire are broadly consistent with the British experience, not particularly surprising as both sides target communications centres and there are few discreet avenues for supplies in rural Normandy. /9
MHV repeatedly quotes Charles Dick.
I've not read this - nor do I end up particularly encouraged as it appears Charles' has absorbed some questionable material. /10
I've not read this - nor do I end up particularly encouraged as it appears Charles' has absorbed some questionable material. /10
One of the biggest questions of the Normandy campaign is whether the "artillery war of the British and Americans" sees firepower efficiently employed.
Dick appears to fixate on inappropriate use of firepower, a bold move given many of the core studies needed don't exist. /11
Dick appears to fixate on inappropriate use of firepower, a bold move given many of the core studies needed don't exist. /11
I'm also very sceptical that Dick comprehends the troop density was so wildly different in theatre. German mortars and Nebelwerfers are only so effective due to v high concentration of Allied troops.
This forces the Allies to rapidly react, creating innovative new units etc /12
This forces the Allies to rapidly react, creating innovative new units etc /12
A point I'll return to later.
Air OPs are extensively discussed in how they counter arty. Now they were undeniably useful in locating mortars and dissuading arty from engaging targets - drone fapclub take note - but this was underpinned by radical systems' evolution. /13
Air OPs are extensively discussed in how they counter arty. Now they were undeniably useful in locating mortars and dissuading arty from engaging targets - drone fapclub take note - but this was underpinned by radical systems' evolution. /13
It's all the back room stuff that sees AOP become so effective; massively improved CMO, sound ranging, flash spotting.
Closer integration across divisions/corps & constant refinement, inclusion of photo recce & patrol reports etc. /14
Closer integration across divisions/corps & constant refinement, inclusion of photo recce & patrol reports etc. /14
This is far more complex than previously presented. It is a battle of developing systems with multiple points of contingency than a single flash toy.
Airpower is also broadly moot to AOPs in Normandy. This just feels a bit confused. /15
Airpower is also broadly moot to AOPs in Normandy. This just feels a bit confused. /15
learning – rarely integrated into airpower unless photo recce etc. Far more complex, overpush of tactical airpower. Very tight integration often with multiple degrees of contingency.
AOPs don't always pay off - but another story. /16
AOPs don't always pay off - but another story. /16
Dick's book appears very influential to MHV at the very least, while it feels Neitzel is reliant on many campaign studies.
Inference of less armoured aggression by western Allies, which I find deeply questionable. /17
Inference of less armoured aggression by western Allies, which I find deeply questionable. /17
“The British didn’t learn manoeuvre warfare until possibly the 1980s”
“Fought like the first world war.”
Yup. It feels that a lot of flawed historiography underpinning this, and classic derpy postwar study. /18
“Fought like the first world war.”
Yup. It feels that a lot of flawed historiography underpinning this, and classic derpy postwar study. /18
The Germans did attempt to make good their artillery problems, often stemming from aerial interdiction inland, with airpower - but it ultimately failed to achieve the massive carpet-CB effect.
Most British smoke use was to obfuscate from observers - not tanks. /19
Most British smoke use was to obfuscate from observers - not tanks. /19
On a higher level/strategic level Wehrmacht not very adaptive in theatre for *many* reasons, Normandy highlights painful inability to swiftly learn/adapt at a tactical level as seen by armoured/infantry casualties. /20
So yes, all in... this wasn't particularly impressive - serving to highlight how relying on others' preconceptions of Normandy continues to ultimately damage grand narratives in general and cripple insightful analysis.
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Want to say thanks to @warriorscomeout for their post highlighting this, and making me spend my morning mulling on this topic!
