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Today I released a report on Huawei and 5G, with a focus on clarifying the Canadian equities and outlining why the government of Canada needs to chart a strategic path forward https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/huawei-5g-clarifying-the-canadian-equities-and-charting-a-strategic-path-forward/
As the takeaway, I argue that Canada does not have a ‘Huawei problem’ per se, so much as a strategy problem linked to the government lacking integrated industrial, cyber security, and foreign policy strategies that address 5G writ large.
The report provides a background to 5G, Huawei, and the stances of close Canadian allies, before shifting to talk about IP and commercial espionage, monopoly and trade, technical security, and rule of law issues linked to Huawei.
The report assesses the kinds of evidence used to critique Huawei & then outlines mitigations to different issues linked with Huawei products. While some of these mitigations are specific to Chinese companies, many pertain beyond such companies.
The government should reassess how it supports universities and other organizations developing IP, in terms of funding models, enabling participation in standards, as well as how defensive briefings from CSIS are prepared and presented.
As Huawei has grown in international dominance there is a risk that telecom networks turn into monocultures; this has security as well as trade and geopolitical implications. Diversity of networks is key and middle powers should work to reduce unfair competition.
Technical security concerns include accidental bugs in code or deliberate vulnerabilities inserted at government behest. Information assurance needs to be ramped up, such as allied countries mimicking the UK model and assessing all major companies’ 5G equipment.
The CSE and CSIS also have roles to play in technical security, by leveraging their mandates while being carefully kept inside the bounds of law by federal courts and/or review bodies in Canada.
Over past years, Huawei executives have argued they would resist any efforts by China to insert vulnerabilities into their equipment. While that may be true, I outline why such resistance in Chinese courts is likely to be moot.
Ultimately, Canada needs a strategy that is vendor neutral, that enables Canadian IP endeavours, reduces security risks linked broadly with 5G equipment, and is designed to foster Canadian values through foreign policy.
Canada needs to chart a course with its friends and allies that protects critical infrastructure while, broadly, defining how to strategically engage with the Chinese government. To date, there is no public evidence Huawei has inserted backdoors at China’s behest.
Also to date, most of the loudest concerns about Huawei are how they might behave when compelled by the Chinese government. This speaks to the crux of the problem: an increasingly assertive and belligerent China, that can leverage successful businesses in its political affairs.
In conclusion, addressing Huawei alone won’t make Canada safe, won’t ensure our IP sectors thrive, won’t solve our broader challenges with China. The government needs a plan that addresses these issues while, at the same time, responds to the issues specifically linked to Huawei.
I want to thank all of the government officials, academics, and employees in private companies who spoke with me, as well as the named and anonymous reviewers alike. I appreciate their time, candour, and humour in answering my questions.
Thanks, too, to my @citizenlab colleagues for their assistance and in particular @rizhouto, @MilesJKenyon, and @RonDeibert, as well as @JoshGold3 during his tenure with the Lab.
Again: the report is available at: https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/huawei-5g-clarifying-the-canadian-equities-and-charting-a-strategic-path-forward/, and there’s an accompanying FAQ at https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/huawei-and-5g-explained/
