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The 79th anniversary of Japan's opening offensives began on Dec 7. Instead of focusing on the well-known events featuring the western Allies, I wanted to focus on Japan's first defeat of the wider Asia-Pacific War. (Please note most photos in this thread are only flavour.)
The defeat was at the hands of the Chinese at the Third Battle of Changsha. The Japanese operation began Dec 24, 1941 and ran until Jan 15, 1942. The stated objective, per Japanese Monograph No. 71, is below. The gist? Tie down Chinese troops so they couldn't relieve Hong Kong.
Two prior Japanese offensives toward Changsha had been repulsed by the Chinese. The most recent failure had been in Sept-Oct 1941. In frustration, the Japanese had resorted to the use of poison gas, but to no avail. Changsha remained in Chinese hands.
Why Changsha? It was, and is, the capital of Hunan province, which provided much needed manpower, income, and food for China in its War of Resistance. Changsha itself was also a critical transportation hub. Gen Anami Korechika thought its capture would end the China quagmire.
Anami, seen below as Minister of War, was the commander of 11th Army at the time. After the Battle of Wuhan, in the words of historian Tobe Ryoichi, 11th Army "was the only strategic corps-size force with capability of making deep penetrations into Nationalist territories."
Opposing Anami was IX War Zone under Gen Xue Yue. Xue's forces had repulsed the previous two assaults on the city using what Richard Frank terms the "counterpunch." In short, allowing the Japanese to overextend and outrun their logistics, before falling on their flanks and rear.
3rd Changsha and the attack on Hong Kong were part of the same Japanese plan. The IJA's 3rd, 6th, & 40th divisions were supported by the 9th Independent Mixed Brigade, 1st Air Brigade, and transport, engineering, and other smaller elements. The initial attacks made good progress.
Weather was freezing. Anami ignored IGHQ directives, and overstretched his forces, by turning what was supposed to be a feint into an all-out offensive to capture Changsha. He had been denied his prize in Sept-Oct. Japanese intelligence badly underestimated Chinese defences.
Changsha was surrounded on three sides by the IJA 3rd and 6th divisions by Jan 1, but they could not overcome the resistance of the Chinese 10th Army. To make matters worse, the Japanese had bypassed multiple Chinese units in their charge to Changsha, including arty on Tamoshan.
On Jan 4, more Chinese armies arrived to relieve the 10th Army in Changsha. Further north, more Chinese armies began to slice into Anami's rear, which was held together with a shoestring. The 3rd, 6th, and bulk of the 40th divisions were now encircled by nine Chinese armies.
The Japanese monograph does its best to understate what had occurred, and maintains that they conducted an orderly withdrawal from Jan 4-11. You see, they didn't want Changsha after all. They had accomplished their objective, and now it was time to leave. All according to plan.
Even the monograph admits that things were a bit rough. The IJA 3rd and 6th divisions needed to be resupplied by air just so they could attempt a breakout. The cold, and multiple Chinese armies that weren't supposed to be there according to intelligence, didn't make things easy.
The Japanese eventually made it back to their starting positions, having taken significant casualties. Reasons for the defeat are many. Chief among them was Anami's poorly supported charge on Changsha that left his forces strung out, undersupplied, and with virtually no artillery
Chinese skill shouldn't be dismissed either. Xue was a highly capable officer, and the Chinese fought hard wherever they engaged. Particularly the beleaguered 10th Army in Changsha, which fought two IJA divisions to a standstill while it awaited relief.
Sorting out casualties in most battles of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War is impossible. Official Japanese losses, stated below, are likely too low. Historian Franco Macri cites figures between 10-23K Japanese casualties, and notes the large amount of bodies and equipment left behind.
The Chinese overclaimed significantly. Xue claimed 33,941 Japanese killed and 23,003 severely wounded. Chinese casualties were likely higher than the Japanese, given prior precedent in the conflict and the number of Chinese engaged. Whatever the figures, Japan was defeated.
Anami failed to capture and hold Changsha, which appeared to be his objective regardless of what the Japanese said on paper. However, the Japanese failed even by their own standard. The operation started too late to draw Chinese forces away from Hong Kong or Burma.
The Chinese were preparing as fast as possible to attack the Japanese forces in Canton and Hong Kong as per Allied plans, but Hong Kong collapsed faster than anticipated. Nor did the Changsha offensive prevent the Chinese from sending forces to Burma.
Macri argues defeat in the Third Battle of Changsha was "much more damaging" than the first two Changsha defeats, and "their victory in the Pearl River Delta did not compensate for the losses sustained or for the geopolitical impact of defeat in Hunan."
The victory gave the Chinese a huge morale boost, was a welcomed break from bad news in the west as well. Frank states that regardless of the scale of the defeat, "the Chinese success was a great deal more than their Allies could claim in the six months after Pearl Harbor."
The best narrative of the Third Battle of Changsha in English can be found in Macri's _Clash of Empires in South China_. The maps in this thread are also from that work, which is superb and covers a lot more than this one engagement. Buy it nao.
Additional sources are below. Japanese Monograph No. 71 is available online on HyperWar. Special thanks to @BHD124 for giving me a second opinion and assisting with some of the research for this thread.
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/
