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In December 2017, IPPR published the "Shared Market" - a workable proposal for a soft Brexit. It introduced the idea of regulatory alignment + a customs union.
It got positive write ups in the FT and the Daily Express, and interest from Barnier's team in Brussels.
It got positive write ups in the FT and the Daily Express, and interest from Barnier's team in Brussels.
Polling preferences found that it performed very strongly as a second choice for *both* Leavers and Remainers.
But alas, as in politics as in life, people dug in for their first preferences (hard Brexit vs Remain).
A workable soft Brexit was dismissed by all sides.
But alas, as in politics as in life, people dug in for their first preferences (hard Brexit vs Remain).
A workable soft Brexit was dismissed by all sides.
There was initial interest from David Davis - who I discussed the report with.
The Tories were attracted to the idea of "managed divergence" with proportionate consequences.
But they hated the customs union because for many it was about realigning to the US.
The Tories were attracted to the idea of "managed divergence" with proportionate consequences.
But they hated the customs union because for many it was about realigning to the US.
I also discussed the report with John McDonnell and Keir Starmer.
McDonnell initially wanted to signal Labour support for the proposal--but faced opposition from Seumas Milne who was concerned that it would prevent "socialist trade deals". Starmer fell in behind LOTO too.
McDonnell initially wanted to signal Labour support for the proposal--but faced opposition from Seumas Milne who was concerned that it would prevent "socialist trade deals". Starmer fell in behind LOTO too.
The Labour leadership's strategy after the 2017 GE was to be publicly against May's withdrawal agreement while hoping that there would be sufficient Labour rebels for it to pass.
When that didn't happen, Labour was like a rabbit stuck in the headlights for 18 months.
When that didn't happen, Labour was like a rabbit stuck in the headlights for 18 months.
By the time of GE 2019, Labour had convinced Remainers it was for Leave and Leavers it was for Remain. It was the worst of all possible worlds.
The problem was trying to be too clever by half. Labour should have locked into a position - any position frankly - and fought for it.
The problem was trying to be too clever by half. Labour should have locked into a position - any position frankly - and fought for it.
The strategy of hard Remainers was clear - to try and force a choice between no deal and no Brexit. To do this, they deliberately toxified soft Brexit options such as the Shared Market.
They knew soft Brexit was the strategically wiser course but rejected it.
They knew soft Brexit was the strategically wiser course but rejected it.
Given a choice between hard/no deal Brexit, I backed a second referendum. I don't regret that.
But the country said it would prefer no deal to no Brexit.
And here we are, on the edge of a hard Brexit (though with a deal, I think).
But the country said it would prefer no deal to no Brexit.
And here we are, on the edge of a hard Brexit (though with a deal, I think).
