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After a brief exchange with a colleague I deeply respect, I'm struck again by the lack of consensus about what we mean by "civilian control."
For me, it's more than: (1) no military coups; (2) no public military pushback; or (3) the military will follow orders. 1/
For me, it's more than: (1) no military coups; (2) no public military pushback; or (3) the military will follow orders. 1/
The U.S. military does almost always follow the orders it receives, but it also has the ability to shape or selectively execute those orders -- sometimes visibly and sometimes without civilian leaders even realizing they're doing so.
Process and personnel are important. 2/
Process and personnel are important. 2/
It's one reason why strong civilian leadership in the Pentagon, especially in the form of a competence civilian SecDef who shares the President's fundamental priorities is so vital.
No President has the time to monitor the mil bureaucracy fully so civilian pol support is key. 3/
No President has the time to monitor the mil bureaucracy fully so civilian pol support is key. 3/
Many discussions also tend to assume away the potential tradeoffs between effectiveness and control.
I do think there is an inherent Clausewitzean link between political direction and strategic success, but that is not the same as saying "more control=strategic success." 4/
I do think there is an inherent Clausewitzean link between political direction and strategic success, but that is not the same as saying "more control=strategic success." 4/
For all their strengths as parsimonious theories, Huntington and Cohen both tend to assume away this problem and make their cases on dubious empirical grounds.
Janowitz and Feaver are better, but are also more complicated and less prescriptive in many ways. 5/
Janowitz and Feaver are better, but are also more complicated and less prescriptive in many ways. 5/
As I noted, part of this is because we simply don't agree on what "civilian control" means in practice.
You don't need even need to assume ill intent by military leaders. Most try to do a good job, but they have their own preferences and their policy view is often narrow. 6/
You don't need even need to assume ill intent by military leaders. Most try to do a good job, but they have their own preferences and their policy view is often narrow. 6/
Another part is because we disagree about when control is desirable, and that is increasingly shaped by our polarized politics. (see, e.g., the adults in the room narratives in the Trump administration). 7/
We also tend to have a very executive-centric view of "civilian control," that minimizes the role of Congressional oversight and appropriations in strategic practice. 8/
I still come back to this great @jpclark97 article in @Strategy_Bridge as a good starting point for this discussion, but there are many dimensions we need to think through more carefully if civ-mil theories & models are going to real practical benefit. 9/9 https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/4/4/unpacking-civilian-control-of-the-military
