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Our latest Syria Situation Report from @apgreco covers the events of the past three weeks.
Offering some additional analysis of the most important of these events on this thread, ICYMI.
Offering some additional analysis of the most important of these events on this thread, ICYMI.
Interesting developments in Dera’a:
On Nov. 11-12, the Russian-backed 5th Corps, 8th Brigade prevented Iranian-backed forces from storming al-Karak.
On Nov. 26, the Iranian-backed Syrian Air Force Intelligence arrested four members of the 5th Corps, 8th Brigade in al-Karak.
On Nov. 11-12, the Russian-backed 5th Corps, 8th Brigade prevented Iranian-backed forces from storming al-Karak.
On Nov. 26, the Iranian-backed Syrian Air Force Intelligence arrested four members of the 5th Corps, 8th Brigade in al-Karak.
Tensions in al-Karak, in SE Dera’a Province, began days earlier when opposition gunmen attacked a SAFI checkpoint, killing 5 and kidnapping 6.
The 5th Corps, 8th Brigade arranged release of those kidnapped, but SAFI demanded locals surrender the gunmen and dozens of weapons.
The 5th Corps, 8th Brigade arranged release of those kidnapped, but SAFI demanded locals surrender the gunmen and dozens of weapons.
When al-Karak’s residents refused, Iranian-backed forces surrounded the town — planning to search homes and carry out arbitrary arrests.
Intervention of Russian-backed forces to prevent this, and subsequent retaliation by Iranian-backed forces, surfaces several assessments:
Intervention of Russian-backed forces to prevent this, and subsequent retaliation by Iranian-backed forces, surfaces several assessments:
1. The security situation in Dera’a Province, and southern Syria writ large, continues to deteriorate.
2. Russian-backed forces are committed to proving reconciliation can last, turning to negotiation to deal with local unrest when other pro-regime forces turn to violence.
2. Russian-backed forces are committed to proving reconciliation can last, turning to negotiation to deal with local unrest when other pro-regime forces turn to violence.
3. Russian-Iranian competition in southern Syria is heating up. Russian- and Iranian-backed units have different approaches to, and ambitions in, southern Syria. Pro-regime units will arrest or even kill members of other pro-regime units, undermining the pro-regime coalition.
4. There is increasingly little role for Assad himself. Most regime units in southern Syria have been co-opted or infiltrated by Russia, Iran, or both. The Assad regime therefore struggles to influence events as an independent actor and cannot prevent fighting among its allies.
Separately, there’s been an uptick in both confirmed and possible ISIS activity, including attacks on the regime in Hama and Homs (confirmed), three attacks in Turkish-held N Aleppo Province (may be PKK), and an attack on Turkish-backed forces in Hasakah Province (may be PKK).
For more on attributing the attacks in N Aleppo, see my earlier thread here: https://twitter.com/isabelivanescu/status/1331391818911674369
These events suggest that ISIS is reconstituting networks and expanding its geographic reach.
Meanwhile, the SDF released ISIS’s former Emir of Public Relations, 23 ISIS fighters, and 515 ISIS family members from prisons and camps. This will only speed an ISIS resurgence.
Meanwhile, the SDF released ISIS’s former Emir of Public Relations, 23 ISIS fighters, and 515 ISIS family members from prisons and camps. This will only speed an ISIS resurgence.
Finally, some notable regime-Russia economic activity:
Two Russian oil companies, Mercury and Villada, were granted certificates to operate in Damascus. This is likely a precursor for contracts to extract Syrian oil. Such a contact would benefit the regime’s struggling economy.
Two Russian oil companies, Mercury and Villada, were granted certificates to operate in Damascus. This is likely a precursor for contracts to extract Syrian oil. Such a contact would benefit the regime’s struggling economy.
Faced with extensive US-sanctions, the Assad regime is reliant on both black-market trade and rescue from its foreign patrons (Russia and Iran) to keep its coffers full and sustain the war effort.
Russia pledged $1 billion in reconstruction funds to Assad in early November.
However, as Russia’s own economy struggles, mutually-beneficial economic activity like contracts for resource extraction will likely take the place of outright payments.
However, as Russia’s own economy struggles, mutually-beneficial economic activity like contracts for resource extraction will likely take the place of outright payments.
