@Foreman1David I find myself in disagreement with a number of points; I don't want to say that u r necessarily wrong but philosophically speaking it is far from obvious that u r right & hence there is room for considerable, in my mind reasonable, disagreement. I'll elaborate: /1 https://twitter.com/Foreman1David/status/1334986926248615936

i) I imagine that by "states of mind are also states of brain" u have a sort of type physicalism in mind where mental events can be grouped into types & these correspond to types of physical events in the brain. But there are other possibilities... /2

... particularly token identity physicalism, according to which mental events are identical with physical events, but there is no type-type correspondence & mental events are unlikely to have steady or categorical biological correlates. /3

In words of German Berrios, neurobiological representation of such mental states "would not be fixed (in the sense of hard-wired) but fleeting & dynamic... there would be no ‘mental function’ with which it would be associated." (2014) /4

ii) The above is also relevant when it comes to computational aspects of cognition, or when mental states have symbolic & connotational meaning. Symbolic meaning is associated with neural activity, but such symbolic meaning may not be reducible to neural activity. /5

iii) U write at one point: "brain states cause (using Aristotelian terminology, are the efficient cause of) states of mind". I disagree with that. Brain states are not *efficient causes* of mental status. If mental states are *identical* to brain states, we cannot say that... /6

... one *causes* the other. Secondly, brain states might conceivably be *material causes* rather than efficient. If I experience humiliation, it is the humiliating event that is the efficient cause, not the corresponding brain state. /7

Such linear causation b/w brain states & mental states is also disputed by de Haan: "we cannot say that the amygdala activity is *causing* my being annoyed, nor the other way around, that my annoyance is *causing* my amygdala to be extra active" (2020) /8

iv) U write: "If it is to be effective, any treatment, be it physical, psychological or social, must improve the brain state causing the problem". If brain states are not always *efficient causes* then we cannot simply assume that it is the brain that is *causing* the problem. /9

Brain states cannot adequate represent sociopolitical causal factors such as "unemployment or childhood sexual abuse. They have brain effects, but the brain effects vary across classes of individuals in ways that depend on other environmental & genetic contexts" (Murphy,2020) /10

v) Even if identity hypothesis is correct, a complete translation of mental into the neurological may simply be too complex to be achieved. In such a situation, the explanatory role of mental states could never be eliminated in favor in brain states. /11

vi) Above also relates to efficiency of explanations: “Although humiliation is ultimately expressed in the brain, this does not mean that the basic neurobiological level is necessarily *the most efficient level* at which to observe humiliation” (Kendler, 2005). /12

vii) My over-all point is that there numerous ways in which one can accept the maxim "states of mind are also states of brain" but dispute the implications that u deduce. Some of these ways are: disputing type-type identity; non-reduction of symbolic meaning; disputing ... /13

... linear causation between brain states & mental states; disputing brain states are efficient causes of mental states; non-reduction of emergent phenomena; complexity as a barrier to reduction; and causal efficiency. /14