I'm increasingly starting to think about the idea of two separate ways of thinking around maneuver war/fare. I like @Heather_at_ACTS recent article on WotR, which ties much of it into the idea of 'blitzkreig' as an enduring myth more than reality.

After reading a lot of doctrines, I sorta can see two trends, that really have a deeper division than I think most who talk about, think about, and teach maneuver warfare realize - namely, in the nature of war.

The two differ primarily in three regards:
- Is the nature of war complex or complicated?
- Is warfare fundamentally knowable, or unknown?
- Should doctrine and philosophy be temporally and spatially bound?

The very fun debate in the MC Gazette on maneuver is fascinating, as it highlights how even the USMC, which at least in theory adheres to the complex, unknowable, and universal application of maneuver warfare (Boydian) still does not have a clear idea of what it entails.

Contrasting it with others, including some of my own colleagues, who apply maneuver warfare through logical frameworks that aren't logically or philosophically rigorous; here Boyd tends to be related to 'he wrote OODA and was a fighter pilot', but then praise Lind.

Is the Boydian approach correct? Can there be a correct view? I'm less certain of that.

But Boyd applies maneuver thinking to a nature of war that is complex and unknowable, which I myself subscribe to.

This basic difference in the view of the nature of war is fascinating, and if referring to Hoiback's anatomy of doctrine we find the vast majority of them out there being logically and philosophically incoherent. In contrast, the Australian and USMC doctrines seem to be coherent.

In the far future I hope to explore these thoughts further, perhaps in more of an article form. If only time grew on trees...

TL;DR: I believe that military institutions need to understand what they believe the nature of war is, and how it affects their doctrines and operations; including in how it contrasts with others.