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5. Decline is a Choice
Decline is thus a choice, not a condition. The main path to decline runs through our polarized political system - particularly if divided government produces gridlock.
And the path out might run through an area of rare consensus: the China challenge.
Decline is thus a choice, not a condition. The main path to decline runs through our polarized political system - particularly if divided government produces gridlock.
And the path out might run through an area of rare consensus: the China challenge.
6. Domestic Policy
The China challenge is primarily in econ/tech spaces.
It isn't quite like the militarized and often existential Cold War.
And a robust domestic agenda - R&D, education, infrastructure, industrial policy - is critical to meeting it.
The China challenge is primarily in econ/tech spaces.
It isn't quite like the militarized and often existential Cold War.
And a robust domestic agenda - R&D, education, infrastructure, industrial policy - is critical to meeting it.
7. Framing Policy
Framing that agenda not only in domestic terms but also as part of an effort to sustain US competitiveness relative to China could build consensus.
It's also honest: we want US workers, businesses, universities, etc. to succeed in that competition.
Framing that agenda not only in domestic terms but also as part of an effort to sustain US competitiveness relative to China could build consensus.
It's also honest: we want US workers, businesses, universities, etc. to succeed in that competition.
8. Avoiding Demagoguery
That framing doesn't call for confrontation, a new Cold War, or defeatism.
It does call for great care. Policymakers must condemn racism, demagoguery, and efforts to conflate the CCP with the Chinese people and Asian Americans.
That framing doesn't call for confrontation, a new Cold War, or defeatism.
It does call for great care. Policymakers must condemn racism, demagoguery, and efforts to conflate the CCP with the Chinese people and Asian Americans.
9. Some Consensus Possible
Both parties are retiring orthodoxies and converging on transformative ideas across industrial policy, state-market relations, R&D, and trade policy.
China policy is at the heart of many of these shifts and likely to remain so.
Both parties are retiring orthodoxies and converging on transformative ideas across industrial policy, state-market relations, R&D, and trade policy.
China policy is at the heart of many of these shifts and likely to remain so.
10. New Thinking
There's more consensus that market forces alone won't halt inequality, sustain growth, secure the country, or ensure competitiveness against China’s state champions.
Great powers need competent states. We've let our institutions atrophy for 40+ years.
There's more consensus that market forces alone won't halt inequality, sustain growth, secure the country, or ensure competitiveness against China’s state champions.
Great powers need competent states. We've let our institutions atrophy for 40+ years.
11. Obstructionism Benefits China
Advancing the China framing on these issues matters, because, as @thomaswright08 puts it, "Senate Republicans must ask themselves if the United States can afford two or four years of legislative stagnation if we are to compete with China.”
Advancing the China framing on these issues matters, because, as @thomaswright08 puts it, "Senate Republicans must ask themselves if the United States can afford two or four years of legislative stagnation if we are to compete with China.”
12. Conclusion
Handled judiciously, external competitors can push the US to become its best self.
US politicians once endeavored to leave foreign policy “at the water’s edge.”
In this time of partisan gridlock, domestic consensus may begin beyond America’s shores.
Handled judiciously, external competitors can push the US to become its best self.
US politicians once endeavored to leave foreign policy “at the water’s edge.”
In this time of partisan gridlock, domestic consensus may begin beyond America’s shores.
