#Thread

1) The U.S has long claimed that Iran's missile program and regional policies need to be addressed. Truth is, these matters don't need to be addressed by or with the U.S.

In fact, Iran will not negotiate away its own security with an outside actor with no standing.

2) If Iran's missile program or regional policies are truly a matter of concern, the "concerned parties" are - in principle - Iran' Arab neighbours.

3) Neighbours that Iran has on numerous occasions invited to sit and address these concerns - while hearing Iran's - within the framework of the Hormuz Peace Endeavor ( #HOPE).

4) This is a framework that could lead to a pact of non-aggression, a collective regional security arrangement, and a comprehensive cooperation regime encompassing arms race, freedom of navigation, terrorism, energy security and more.

5) Unfortunately, Iran's Arab neighbours (especially Saudi Arabia and UAE) persistently rejected Iran's calls for exploring this path, while imprudently banking on provoking the Trump administration into a full blow economic (and eventually) military war with Iran.

6) This approach failed; As did @SecPompeo's "maximum pressure" policy which aimed at forcing Iran to surrender its strategic levers and irresponsibly compromise its own security - for generations to come - in a region marred by uncertainty and hostile actors.

7) So if @JoeBiden and his team are to learn anything from the past - and if they're truly tasked to "reimagine" national security as @jakejsullivan put it - exploring the opportunities offered by the Hormuz Peace Endeavor seem the right way to go.

8) We know that insisting on renegotiating the terms of the JCPOA and/or conditioning compliance with the nuclear deal upon Iran agreeing to direct follow-on negotiations with the U.S over its missile program or other strategic levers are doomed to fail.

9) On the other hand, the @JoeBiden administration can reformulate its demands in a way that would simultaneously validate Iran's legitimate security concerns while addressing what it dubs as its concerns over Iran's regional policies.

10) According to the new formula, the U.S would immediately go back to compliance with its JCPOA - or UNSC Res. 2231 - obligations as a principled confidence-building measure; Then use its "good offices" to incite its Arab allies to talk to Iran within the #HOPE framework.

11) In other words, the JCPOA will remain intact to the benefit of all parties, while the so-called "follow-on negotiations" will directly occur between Iran and its Arab neighbours, with US facilitation and final endorsement through a UNSC resolution.