1. The majority of the post-assassination commentary has been focusing on how the particular timing of the killing of #Fakhrizadeh might have served the purpose of sabotaging any Biden’s attempts at (re)negotiating the JCPOA, paying little attention to the wider picture. https://twitter.com/guardian/status/1332474644218191873

2. Israel’s long-lasting efforts in thwarting Iran’s nuclear programme have been materialising through a long list of multi-pronged operations (also jointly w. US), of which a good part conducted during the Obama adm., before the JCPOA.

3. Whether this episode would jeopardise (or not) the US reentering and renegotiation of the JCPOA, it serves as a reminder of what was the main divergence element btw Isr and the Obama adm. on the Iran nuclear issue yesterday, and why it is still so today.

4. While strategies may differ from one Pres to another - perhaps being more personalistic - threat perceptions tend to be static, regardless of leadership changes. And while nuc cap are seen as threatening from both the US and Isr, the conventional ones are perceived differently

5. Isr has been striking on Iran’s missile factories and sites for a bunch of years. The immediate threats that Isr faces today are non-nuclear, and are stationed at the very border (Syria, Lebanon). Allowing Iran to get a nuc option would add an additional security layer.

6. This explains Israel’s strong opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo as part of the deal, and eventually the convergence with the UAE that shares similar worries about Iran’s conventional cap.

7. As for the US, the conventional element does not represent an equally pressing issue. While containing Iran’s regional ambitions, protecting its assets in the region and preventing NW prolif remain priorities, Iran’s conventional cap. are not perceived as a direct threat.