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Personally tough for me to read this profound timeline (should be required history for all those who don’t know how we got here) as I served parts of, or in some cases the entire year, in AFG from DEC ‘01-2019. My perspectives on this... https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan
2/ We were shocked and angry by the events of 9/11 and launched a punitive “raid” to get those who had perpetrated the act AND with the clear intent (minus a clear strategy) on ensuring we never ever had another 9/11 come from that sanctuary.
3/ About that strategy...we failed to get UBL (you could argue that we were afraid to pursue him in Tora Bora) and he hopped the border to Pakistan. The Taliban melted in the face of massive aerial attacks orchestrated by SOF and paramilitary forces and then we settled in...
4/ When I arrived for the first time in Dec ‘01 (CDR 1st Rgr Bn) we were told we couldn’t raise an American flag over our compound in Bagram. We were told guidance (from Rumsfeld) was, we aren’t staying, we aren’t occupying and (wait for it) we absolutely aren’t nation building.
5/ And we didn’t...initially. My first tour ended with the bitter pull of Robert’s Ridge and the loss of several teammates who didn’t have to die (cliche to say in war but true in this case). About a year later the nation executed student body left and invaded Iraq.
6/ In Iraq we did what we do best and smashed Saddam’s forces, captured or killed all the major players in his regime and then created our own insurgency through the bone headed de-Baathafication effort and becoming de facto occupiers. Meanwhile AFG was pretty quiet.
7/ Until it wasn’t and by ‘06-‘07 we were in two knife fights with Iraq always more prominent in the headlines but AFG no less dire. We transitioned administrations still without a strategy for “winning” and then applied the same tried and true “surge” for AFG.
8/ While AFG boiled we seemed to have achieve some level of stability in IZ (carefully eschewing the use of the word “modicum” there). And eventually we went from “Iraqi lead” to complete transition tied to an end date (2011) rather than and end state.
9/ We were determined to do the same in AFG (2014 was the stated end date) but I’d like to believe the failure of sustained security and the development of ISIS in Iraq and Syria less than 2 years after our withdrawal caused a revision of the strategy.
10/ Another administration change, similarly intent on stopping “endless wars” but they consented to one more “push.” Resulted in what was described today as strategic stalemate. Foreseeable? TB said right from the beginning, “you have the watches, we have the time.”
