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I know everyone is talking about #NATO2030 right now. But if you seek a short break and want to look at something else that will be important in 2030, here is a short threat on UK-German military innovation, based on a paper you can find here https://bit.ly/3ogaUB8 THREAD [1/20]
As you might have guessed, this is the third (and final) instalment in the short paper series I had the pleasure of writing with my colleagues @SophiaGBecker and @Ce_Moll. Thanks again to @policyatkings, @armida_lm & @hsf_uk for publishing, management & support! [2/20]
Everyone is aware that we are living in times of rapid technological development. From the well-known cases like AI, robotics & hypersonics to the more obscure topics, e.g. the advancement of laser weapons through the convergence of industrial tech https://twitter.com/thewarzonewire/status/1331733514648121344?s=20 [3/20]
Though how armed forces utilise such technological change to enhance military capabilities is traditionally shaped by operational and strategic challenges, support from military and political leaders, available resources, organisational culture & industrial ecosystems. [4/20]
So let’s take a look at each of those factors for Germany and the UK: [5/20]
Strategic challenges: The primary strategic challenge for both armed forces is the return of great power competition & the threat of peer-to-peer conflict. Historically, a good driver of military innovation, especially after an extensive former of other missions. [6/20]
Operational challenges: Both Germany & the UK share similar visions about future warfare & expect similar operational challenges. Information – its generation, distribution and effective use – is the absolute centre of these visions. [7/20]
Political: Currently, both armed forces are largely free to think and publish their visions of future warfare. However, this might change due to uninhabited systems. The idea of automation/autonomy in weapon systems is a political and societal concern in Germany & the UK. [8/20]
Resources: Financial constraints will likely form the background for military innovation in both Germany & the UK. Both will have to balance legacy programs and capabilities and innovation. This will remain true despite recent defence spending increases in both countries. [9/20]
Ecosystems: Both have innovative & technologically advanced ecosystems. UK’s defence innovation ecosystem is more open & more comprehensive in using various avenues of technological change. Current German approach leaves some technological areas untapped for military use. [10/20]
Organisational culture: the UK armed forces establish a more user-centric innovation model in coop. with broader industry, as exemplified in prototype warfare. While the Bundeswehr too is exploring industry coop., it's often doing so with traditional defence suppliers. [11/20]
Conclusion: Visions of operational challenges and industrial efforts seem more aligned in the UK, with a broader scope on potentially useful technologies and potential collaboration actor & user-centric approaches like prototype warfare. Germany faces some blindspots. [12/20]
Four recommendations flow from this analysis that Germany and the UK can implement to enhance their capabilities & to embrace military innovation while both learning from each other and mitigate some of the constraints they will face. [13/20]
1) Embrace reciprocal conceptual and organisational learning. Armed forces in Germany & the UK can learn from each other in conceptual and organisational approaches to military innovation. Currently, the Bundeswehr could learn about Prototype Warfare and UK experiences [14/20]
2a) Encourage radical thinking, but benchmark continually. Open and bottom-up innovation approaches need to be benchmarked continuously against both existing military capabilities & different innovative approaches. [15/20]
2b) A dedicated joint training centre or a joint experimental unit especially for uninhabited systems and their integration could provide an opportunity to test and learn together in Germany (Sennelager 4.0 anyone?) or at Salisbury Plains in the UK. [16/20]
3) Seek political & equipment cooperation in uninhabited systems. Without societal and political buy-in on finetuned regulation of uninhabited systems and their acceptable degree of autonomy, the military vision of a future of warfare that includes them can’t be realised. [17/20]
4a) Strengthen standardisation. Digitalisation & interoperability are key to information-centric warfare. Germany & the UK, still digitalising their armed forces, would benefit from pushing this topic early on in NATO while aligning national developments accordingly. [18/20]
4b) Since civilian-commercial technological developments set a growing number of standards, both would also benefit from earlier upstream cooperation in shaping industrial standards via collaboration between the EU and UK and in international organisations active there. [19/20]
You can find a shorter 800-word version with the key messages in English and German of this paper on military innovation here: https://bit.ly/3ojxFEf Thanks for reading! The end. [20/20]
