One of my favorite debates in Islamic studies right now concerns the precise character of al-Ghazali's theological standings. The basic contours of the matter are simple: was he more Ash'ari or more Avicennan? The finer details, however, get extremely slippery...

What's so tricky about this question is the fact that Ghazali sometimes speaks like an Ash'ari, and other times like an Avicennan. On the issue of causality, for instance, it's not always so clear whether Ghazali is an occasionalist or an Aristotelian. In some places, he clearly

voices his belief in the reality of secondary efficient causation; whereas, in other places, he is quite insistent that there is no agent (فاعل) besides God. How, then, to solve this quandary? To my eyes, the best attempt heretofore is Frank Griffel's (2015). The solution

that he proposes almost feels like cheating, at first, but it makes a lot of sense on closer inspection. Essentially, Griffel says, ¿Porque no los dos? Ghazali's ambivalence on the issue of causation bespeaks his acceptance of *both* paradigms - occasionalist and Aristotelian -

without claiming one to be more true than the other. This is because of the nature of modality, as Ghazali understands it. On an Aristotelian understanding (at least, as filtered through Avicenna), causation is understood as *necessary*: that is, if a cause is present, and

there are no obstacles, then the effect *must* happen. Ghazali takes issue with this notion. In his view, the connection between cause and effect can't be necessary - after all, I can imagine a universe in which, say, cotton is exposed to fire and yet doesn't burn. If one can

imagine such a universe (i.e., a possible world), then it must be within God's power to make things just so. To imagine otherwise would compromise God's freedom, which is a big no no. Thus, we have no good warrant for claiming the necessary connection between a cause and its

effect. God's ordinance (حكم) must always stand, in one way or another, between the two. Still, it is possible to imagine the mechanics of concomitant events in different ways. It may yet be true that God effects (v.) effects (n.) *through* preceding events, such that we can

still believe in secondary causes (even if they aren't believed to be necessary). At the same time, it might also be true that God directly creates each sequential event, according to a certain habit (عادة) that He imposes upon Himself. In either case, from a human perspective,

it doesn't do much harm to imagine cause and effect as being connected. From the perspective of physics, it doesn't make much difference whether causes and effects are connected through secondary causation or through God's habit. Metaphysically speaking, however, there's no

way of demonstrating, beyond doubt, the superior descriptive power of one account over the other. Both equally "save the phenomena," so to speak. And - importantly - both allow that God is the only *true* efficient cause: whether through direct intervention (occasionalism) or

through His position as prime mover (Aristotenlianism). Either way, what's important for Ghazali is that we understand God as the only true agent (فاعل). In this way, Griffel solves the puzzle for us - the reason for Ghazali's apparent ambivalence is simply that he WAS

actually ambivalent! Even more interestingly, we should also recognize that Ghazali played an extremely important role in the naturalization of Hellenistic philosophy into Islamic theology. Through his engagement with Avicenna, however critical, Ghazali not only dispensed

with what he found inimical to a properly Islamic worldview, but also appropriated what he found to be true and good.

I think I've understood this debate properly - though maybe others who likely know Ghazali much better than me have critiques? @KhalilAndani @RamonIHarvey @jhoover04 @Evollaqi @winnie4prez?