Read on Twitter
I wrote a big piece about how Democrats have become the party of the superstar city (and its richest suburbs)—and why that seemingly positive demographic trend is also at the heart of the party's biggest political, electoral, and cultural problems https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/why-big-city-dominance-problem-democrats/617161/
Biden won
- all of the 20 largest cities
- 80% of the vote in Manhattan, Boston, & SF
- metro Atlanta by 800k votes
- the 4 major TX metros by 900k votes
That sounds pretty good! But there are three big risks in Democrats' metro coalition:
- all of the 20 largest cities
- 80% of the vote in Manhattan, Boston, & SF
- metro Atlanta by 800k votes
- the 4 major TX metros by 900k votes
That sounds pretty good! But there are three big risks in Democrats' metro coalition:
1. The electoral problem
The Democrats’ metro reliance is a horror-show in the Senate, given the low density of so many small states. In 2018, Democratic Senate candidates won 18 million more votes than Republicans nationwide; and Dems still LOST two net Senate seats.
The Democrats’ metro reliance is a horror-show in the Senate, given the low density of so many small states. In 2018, Democratic Senate candidates won 18 million more votes than Republicans nationwide; and Dems still LOST two net Senate seats.
2) The cultural problem:
America’s largest cities, especially on the coasts, have raced away from the center politically, led by young urban college-educated progressives, who are best understood as a third party fighting for power in a two-party system https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/why-big-city-dominance-problem-democrats/617161/
America’s largest cities, especially on the coasts, have raced away from the center politically, led by young urban college-educated progressives, who are best understood as a third party fighting for power in a two-party system https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/why-big-city-dominance-problem-democrats/617161/
Look at California.
In the last 20 years, SF+LA have raced to the left of the rest of the state on proposition votes. On several issues, like affirmation action, those metros are 30 points(!) to the left of the state. That is akin to the gap between MA & PA in the POTUS vote.
In the last 20 years, SF+LA have raced to the left of the rest of the state on proposition votes. On several issues, like affirmation action, those metros are 30 points(!) to the left of the state. That is akin to the gap between MA & PA in the POTUS vote.
3. The intra-party problem:
Not all metros are the same. The heartwood of the Democratic Party is very left-leaning: NYC, LA, SF. But its big downtown majorities have no room to expand, and its future growth relies on the more sprawling, moderate metros of the south and west.
Not all metros are the same. The heartwood of the Democratic Party is very left-leaning: NYC, LA, SF. But its big downtown majorities have no room to expand, and its future growth relies on the more sprawling, moderate metros of the south and west.
Democrats have so far flipped 5 leg seats in November: 3 House seats—2 in urban NC, one in suburban GA—and 2 Senate seats, in CO and AZ.
Outside of the broader Sun Belt, Democrats did not flip any seats in an election they won handily at the presidential level. Seems important!
Outside of the broader Sun Belt, Democrats did not flip any seats in an election they won handily at the presidential level. Seems important!
Finally, an implication for media:
As national politics has polarized around youth, education, and density, the news industry has become particularly young, educated, and densely packed into a handful of cities.
As national politics has polarized around youth, education, and density, the news industry has become particularly young, educated, and densely packed into a handful of cities.
