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A thread on Azerbaijan’s victory in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in relation to geopolitical questions around the Caucasus’ other breakaway states. As this is Twitter, let me state the obvious I’m not trying to make any points about the justness of such efforts & I abhor war
First & foremost, the role of Russia was quite different to Georgia 08. It never recognized Armenian control of Karabakh. It was/is Armenia’s security guarantor but now as peacekeeper is for rump Karabakh as well (although not by treaty as with Armenia). A status similar
to that between Russia and the separatist entities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia before the 2008 war. Georgia cannot and in my view isn’t thinking too much about military lessons of this conflict because Russia has now recognized those states for 12 years and deeply integrated
their security forces, essentially running them in both. There are more rogue elements in Abkhazia but none that will take a security approach to Georgia different from Moscow. After the 2008 war it’s become clear that barring an unexpected sea change in Moscow there is not a
military route to retaking these territories. But Georgia should think about the military aspects of Armenia’s loss (even as its president and other members of the political class havent exactly bemoaned it). The role of drones was far more pronounced than in ‘08 (or even Donbas)
the West was also entirely absent, which raises questions about how even if some sea change in Moscow does ever come to pass that changes its security guarantee (note even Navalny has supported Russia’s role in this conflicts, see @lincolnpigman and I https://carnegie.ru/commentary/76403 )
it would approach any renewed conflict in Georgia. Back to the real world, does the evolution of Russia’s role from nominal peacekeeper in SO & Abkhazia to security guarantor and independence-recognizer raise the prospect of a similar evolution in Karabakh? Personally, I think
it would be highly unlikely at this stage, but if a geopolitical fissure with Azerbaijan were to emerge as did between Russia and Georgia between 04-08, it would become more likely. Baku will be happy now at the rise of Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus due to the conflict but
it is in some ways more geopolitically constrained and cannot afford to drift too far out of Moscow’s orbit, though that is something the Aliyev government would be unlikely to consider for a number of other reasons as well. As for Turkey’s new role, it is hard to see this
extending in a meaningful way to Georgia’s separatist conflicts. It does not recognize the breakaway states and though there have been business links between Abkhazia and Turkey that occasionally upset Tbilisi, Ankara has shown no signs of taking any particular role in the
status of the conflict. There are cultural links between Turkey and Abkhazia due to the large Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey but it’s not been really politically involved. If Russia and Turkey’s increasingly wide-spread security dances do turn problematic, this would lend itself
to boosting Turkish alignment with Georgia, though not to the point it would involve itself militarily on anything like the scale of support we have seen for Azerbaijan because the Turkish domestic views on the Georgian-Abkhaz/SO versus Armenian-Azeri conflicts are worlds apart.
Furthermore, Russia’s new role in Karabakh, as well as its growing fleet in the Caspian, do further cement the fact Tbilisi has no military path to reincorporating South Ossetia or Abkhazia. One final aside on the impact of the 08 conflict was that Georgia was essentially bailed
out financially by the west. With fears of more economic pain through 2021 and Armenia’s potential need for economic support, can it turn to US/Europe for the same? I fear that is unlikely, (+ Beijing is also now a real option) Pashinyan’s government I think will survive for now
I think, though all indications are it is even more bruised than Saakashvili was after 08. It’s relations with the West are good, but not the romance between Saakashvili and the West at the time, which was also far more involved in that conflict. Whether or not Beijing would be
willing to support Armenia financially if it needs it is a question I’m not sure of the answer to, but I could see it happening. But even if it does, that will not affect its relations with Azerbaijan, & I don’t see it taking a meaningful role in helping Armenia rebuild defenses
