I generally don’t put a lot of stock in “spoiler” arguments when it comes to geopolitics, but today’s assassination in Tehran will make returning to the JCPOA and negotiations with a new US administration much tougher. And that might be the point

Today’s killing brings up old wounds for Iran. Four nuclear scientists were assassinated in a campaign a decade ago. Iran blamed Israel and attempted to retaliate in-kind in a series of failed attacks against Israeli consulate officials in Delhi, Tbilisi, and Bangkok in 2012

Because of those failures, it is doubtful that the IRGC ever felt like it had sufficiently avenged the assassinations of Iranian scientists. The JCPOA was thus a tough compromise for the IRGC, even if it also benefited from it.

This week three Iranians who had been jailed in Thailand for their part in the retaliation campaign against Israel were returned to Iran in a hostage exchange. With that, the story of Iran’s assassinated scientists and the IRGC’s failed retaliation seemed to have come full circle

But now a new circle begins. The IRGC will want to retaliate. One would imagine they also learned from their failures in 2012. Neither the desire to retaliate nor the open wound of a murdered civil servant on the streets of Tehran are conducive to talks and compromise with the US

At the very least, Iran will aim to use today’s assassination as leverage to extract additional concessions from the US/P5+1. More likely, any mood for engagement will be soured, and the Supreme Leader will be furthered pressured by the IRGC to refuse talks and allow for revenge

The bottom line: this attack made Iran look weak. Iran is unlikely to entertain talks in such a position. Iran will want to reestablish the upper hand. That requires risking escalation: either thru revenge attacks, an assertive military posture, or advances in its nuclear program