Okay, time for a thread on @McFaul's very significant contribution, an article on Putin and Putinism in @Journal_IS: https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00390. The article is in the open access for now, so be sure to check it out. A lot of good stuff in there.

Let me begin by saying that I agree with some of @McFaul's key arguments even as I disagree with others. The central argument - drawing on Kenneth Waltz's "first image" - is that leaders matter. Different people pursue different policies because they have different ideas.

In relation to Russia, @McFaul essentially argues that understanding Putin's ideas - "Putinism" - should be crucial to interpreting Russia's foreign policy. A different leader (Yeltsin & Gorbachev are repeatedly mentioned) would have pursued a different policy.

Let's take a look at some of the arguments more closely. Oh, btw, here @McFaul argues that Putin is responsible for the current state of Russia's relations with the West, which is partially correct. On the other hand, as @McFaul likes to point out, it takes two to tango. Onwards!

An important statement here. On we go.

Here we have a statement about Putin's ideology, or Putinism, which is the same as "orthodox illiberalism". I confess being slightly confused by this, especially footnote 96, where Putin, Putinism, and Russian autocracy seem to be conflated into one term - "Putin's leadership".

I would have liked to see a more thorough discussion of what Putinism actually is. Say, how different is Putinism from "Pinochetism"? How different is Putin's homophobia from the homophobia of PiS, and one does one allow for Putinism and the other for NATO membership?

Here @McFaul draws a distinction between Putin and Yeltsin in that the former had a clear commitment to limiting checks on executive power. I'd agree here but of course neither did Yeltsin show democratic proclivities in the face of parliamentary constrains on his power in 1993.

By the way, @McFaul's emphasis on Putin's strong ideological commitment is at odds with his own statement elsewhere in the article that Putin was something of an opportunist in the 1990s (by joining the liberals). I'd argue that both Yeltsin and Putin were opportunists.

Indeed, opportunism is in some ways a better prism for understanding Russia's foreign policy actions than ideological commitments. I am not original in claiming this - just read George Kennan's Long Telegram. It's all there. Consider Crimea.

McFaul argues in the article that it was not in Russia's national interest to annex Crimea. He could have acted much as he did in 2004 and played for the long-haul, hoping to subvert Ukraine's drift to the West. Russia paid considerable costs for annexation (sanctions etc).

I'd agree here to some extent. I would qualify my agreement with @McFaul by suggesting that the cost-benefit analysis he offers in the article is a bit one sided. Yes, Morgan Stanley left Russia and the economy took a hit in terms of a minor decline in GDP growth.

But we'd have to assume that Putin cares more about proverbial Morgan Stanley than about his image as the "consolidator of Russia's lands," which of course means much more in terms of domestic legitimacy. The same analysis could be extended to @McFaul's other example - Syria.

Here, @McFaul argues that Russia's intervention to save Assad is best explained with reference to Putin's affinity for a fellow autocrat. He argues that Russia could have won that much more if it participated in an international effort (together with the US) to unseat Assad.

I beg to disagree here. For a start, it is important to recall that - far from being an expression of Putinism - Russia's involvement in Syria reflects traditional interests in this area. Syria is perhaps Moscow's longest-standing ally in the Middle East.

By the way, in the 1970s, when Moscow shored up Assad's father Hafez Al-Assad, Brezhnev sought a condominium with the US to try to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East (with the result that he was elbowed out when Sadat essentially flipped to the US). A lesson there!

But we don't need to go so far for lessons. Consider Russia's role in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when it was effectively undercut with Dayton, and later with Kosovo. The lesson, which anyone (including Putin) would have learned is that these settlements are a zero-sum game.

Putin by the way was allegedly behind the Russian effort to seize Pristina airport in June 1999, which was nothing if not an effort to pre-empt NATO's attempt to cut Russia out of the settlement in Kosovo.

Hmmmm. Not too keen about these dichotomies. I think categories 'pro-Western' vs 'pro-Russian' obscure more than they illuminate in relation to the former FSU & CEE. Also, I would not agree with describing Petro Poroshenko as pro-Russian.

This here. I'd say that it's not only Putin who thinks that there's a tendency for the US to violate national sovereignty and undermine regimes they dislike.

I'd agree with @McFaul here: capabilities tell us nothing about intentions. But I would argue that capabilities are a prerequisite of intentions. The fact that Russia was "non-interventionist" in the 1990s tells us more about Russia's capabilities than about Yeltsin's intentions.

If you don't agree with this, check out Yeltsin's policy in relation to Chechnya. Where he could - he did.

Overall, lots to agree with in @McFaul's article + some things to definitely disagree with. If I were to point to one issue that I would most strongly take an exception to - it's the issue of determinism. @McFaul argues that Putin has adopted a set of ideas and acts accordingly.

I'd argue that Putin's set of ideas that he has aligned himself with changes depending on circumstances. What does not change is Putin's need for self-legitimation. This in turn depends on prevalent narratives.

To see how this process has worked historically read my recent article: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2020.1820331?journalCode=fjss20. Overall, great stuff, @McFaul - a very illuminating, very seriously researched article that is a must read for anyone interested in the topic of Russia's relations with the West.