1/ Some intellectual throat-clearing on the matter of #ScottishIndependence, in part inspired by answers I gave to a question at Jorg Broschek’s class earlier today about what was happening on that score. An opening caveat – I am far from an expert on either the UK or Scottish...

2/...politics, so these are some half-baked observations by a newcomer who is nevertheless reasonably familiar with independence movements and processes. Take that for what you will (or won’t). There are several elements of note here. The first concerns the level of support...

3/...for independence in Scotland. There has been quite a bit of expectation around what the Brexit process would do to support for Scottish secession. It seemed to have been inching up in 2018 and 2019, but did not reach 50% consistently until spring of this year. I’m not...

4/...aware of a study that has looked systematically at why the support has since crossed that important (political-)psychological threshold, but it seems to me that it is difficult to overstate the role played by Nicola Sturgeon’s management and messaging of the pandemic...

5/...and the immediate and obvious comparison of the (mis?)management of the same by Johnson. Much has already been made of this – the perception that the Scottish executive has been competent, but I think it bears emphasizing just how much of this is the vivid comparison...

6/...provided by the rashness and wobbliness of the UK government and of those daily briefings of the two leaders. Two things stand out to me. The first is the immediate decision to put #indyref2 on the backburner by Sturgeon. No such decision was made by the UK government.

7/ They continued hurtling toward not only Brexit, but a no-deal Brexit. Think back to 2014 referendum and recall the main weakness of the Yes campaign – the charge that they were being irresponsible on the economic front. That Sturgeon parked independence for the sake of...

8/...pandemic management and Johnson did not park Brexit for the same reason turns that logic upside down, at least for now. The second notable thing is just how subtly and ably the Scottish government played the timing game. Once we got past that first month, Sturgeon was...

9/...early to implement what appeared as reasonable and responsible measures, normally preceding UK government by 2-4 weeks (think mask mandate in shops). They were also late to loosen things up (here, think reopening the pubs), again, by about a few weeks. And in some cases...

10/...such as the air bridges, they differed only marginally, but made much of the difference (e.g. keeping Spain and Serbia off the list of air bridges, while the UK government did not – and was later forced to). This strikes me as a series of low-cost, but ultimately very...

11/...effective moves. I have no way of knowing if this is what bumped the support for independence to above 50%, but it’s worth considering. I have no way of knowing if this is what bumped the support for independence to above 50%, but it’s worth considering. The second...

12/...element in the equation is the fact that, while the Scottish government wants (and has been demanding) the right to hold a second referendum, the central government has kept saying no. This brings us into the Catalan scenario, though with some very important differences...

13/...(to be covered below). I find interesting, but unconvincing, the contention that a thumping SNP win in 2021 will/would somehow make UK government’s position on the second referendum untenable. It is not perhaps impossible to see the Tories yield on this issue, but I...

14/...really do not see why they would do this. There is absolutely no political gain to be had from it, and the loss is potentially massive, especially given where the public opinion in Scotland stands now. Moreover, they have a ready-made excuse to keep saying now, which...

15/...incidentally, Gordon Brown articulated better than most: it’s far more important to deal with the pandemic than with the constitutional question. Assuming that the public health crisis provoked by the pandemic is under control by the end of 2021, the fiscal and economic...

16/...fallout will drag on. The third element may be the most significant one. If SNP wins big next year, yeah, they’d have a mandate to push on independence, but would they have an incentive? That’s the paradox of winning big – you really CAN push, but you really don’t HAVE to.

17/ And that relates both to pressures within the SNP and without. If Sturgeon does carry the party to majority, and provided the Salmond saga doesn’t somehow sink her, how could she be assailed? But as importantly, SNP is sovereign (no pun intended, and with all respect to...

18/...the Greens) on the independence terrain. This is the critical difference from the Catalan scenario. In Catalonia, the regional government was pushed to confrontation by independentist outbidding among three independence-minded parties, with the pressure further amplified..

19/...by organized and massive street-level mobilization (which, incidentally, lasted for years). No such dynamic exists here. So if this is right, I can’t see an agreed-upon referendum being called any time soon, nor do I see the Scottish government having too much appetite...

20/...for unilateral action. But the fact that majoritarian (at least in the polls) support for independence is now apparently entrenched, I don’t see this issue going away any time soon. A kind of suspended uncertainty over the medium turn would be my guess.///