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Preliminary insights on the targeted killing of a senior al-Qaeda figure in Iran (1/20)
@INSSIsrael https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/al-masri-abdullah-qaeda-dead.html
@INSSIsrael https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/al-masri-abdullah-qaeda-dead.html
(2/20)
1. He was a central senior leader in al-Qaeda's operational realm.
2. Abdullah was the senior #AlQaeda official responsible for the attacks on the American embassies in #Kenya and #Tanzania on August 7, 1988 (the same date he was reportedly killed 22 years later).
1. He was a central senior leader in al-Qaeda's operational realm.
2. Abdullah was the senior #AlQaeda official responsible for the attacks on the American embassies in #Kenya and #Tanzania on August 7, 1988 (the same date he was reportedly killed 22 years later).
(3/20)
The attacks, which he commanded from #AlQaeda headquarters, killed 224 people and injured thousands more.
The attacks, which he commanded from #AlQaeda headquarters, killed 224 people and injured thousands more.
(4/20)
3. Also involved in the #AlQaeda attacks against Israeli tourists at the Paradise Hotel in #Mombasa in November 2002 and in the attempted attack in which missiles were launched at an Israeli plane upon takeoff, with 261 passengers and 11 crew members aboard.
3. Also involved in the #AlQaeda attacks against Israeli tourists at the Paradise Hotel in #Mombasa in November 2002 and in the attempted attack in which missiles were launched at an Israeli plane upon takeoff, with 261 passengers and 11 crew members aboard.
(5/20)
4. Given recent reports of the death of Dr. Ayman Al- #Zawahiri, bin Laden's successor, Abdullah’s removal leaves the organization's leadership with the Egyptian Saif al-Adel as the last significant veteran senior survivor.
4. Given recent reports of the death of Dr. Ayman Al- #Zawahiri, bin Laden's successor, Abdullah’s removal leaves the organization's leadership with the Egyptian Saif al-Adel as the last significant veteran senior survivor.
(6/20)
5. The assassination in #Tehran indicates that #Iran has served and continues to serve as a safe haven for senior #AlQaeda figures.
5. The assassination in #Tehran indicates that #Iran has served and continues to serve as a safe haven for senior #AlQaeda figures.
(7/20)
Some fled to Iran and took refuge there (under arrest or under house arrest when their movements are restricted) after fleeing Afghanistan following the US offensive to remove the Taliban from power in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Apparently some still resides there.
Some fled to Iran and took refuge there (under arrest or under house arrest when their movements are restricted) after fleeing Afghanistan following the US offensive to remove the Taliban from power in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Apparently some still resides there.
(8/20)
6. Despite the deep animosity between Shiite Iran and Sunni al-Qaeda, the shared resentment of the United States and Iran's cost-benefit considerations,
6. Despite the deep animosity between Shiite Iran and Sunni al-Qaeda, the shared resentment of the United States and Iran's cost-benefit considerations,
(9/20)
which sought to "domesticate the beast" and keep the organization’s senior officials under close scrutiny while maintaining a balance of mutual deterrence, along with al-Qaeda's survival considerations, enabled ad hoc collaboration.
which sought to "domesticate the beast" and keep the organization’s senior officials under close scrutiny while maintaining a balance of mutual deterrence, along with al-Qaeda's survival considerations, enabled ad hoc collaboration.
(10/20)
7. During the years that #AlQaeda fought in Afghanistan alongside the #Taliban, a new generation of leaders has presumably sprung up to replace the veteran leadership probably with less ‘international qualifications and connections’
7. During the years that #AlQaeda fought in Afghanistan alongside the #Taliban, a new generation of leaders has presumably sprung up to replace the veteran leadership probably with less ‘international qualifications and connections’
(11/20)
8. The organization has taken a strategic turn and focused its current activities more on the “near enemy” in the Levant than on the “far enemy” in the West,
8. The organization has taken a strategic turn and focused its current activities more on the “near enemy” in the Levant than on the “far enemy” in the West,
(12/20)
but it has continued, and especially its partners, to carry out attacks around the world (in Africa, the Islamic Maghreb, the Sahel, Southeast Asia, South Asia, mainly Afghanistan, Pakistan).
but it has continued, and especially its partners, to carry out attacks around the world (in Africa, the Islamic Maghreb, the Sahel, Southeast Asia, South Asia, mainly Afghanistan, Pakistan).
(13/20)
9. The United States, regardless which administration, continues to conduct a targeted counterterrorism operation against significant al-Qaeda and ISIS senior figures and operative.
9. The United States, regardless which administration, continues to conduct a targeted counterterrorism operation against significant al-Qaeda and ISIS senior figures and operative.
(14/20)
@realDonaldTrump has maintained #Obama's policy, and presumably that the @JoeBiden administration will continue to do so.
@realDonaldTrump has maintained #Obama's policy, and presumably that the @JoeBiden administration will continue to do so.
(15/20)
10. The Salafi jihadi organizations (mainly #ISIS and its affiliates and #AlQaeda and its affiliates) are in the process of reorganizing and re-consolidating their cadres in different areas around the globe,
10. The Salafi jihadi organizations (mainly #ISIS and its affiliates and #AlQaeda and its affiliates) are in the process of reorganizing and re-consolidating their cadres in different areas around the globe,
(16/20)
using terrorist activities as part of their recovery from the blow inflicted on them with the military defeat of the #IslamicState.
using terrorist activities as part of their recovery from the blow inflicted on them with the military defeat of the #IslamicState.
(17/20)
Their manpower potential has increased in recent years due to the #IslamicState adventure and they have additional potential stockpile of manpower in #Syria - in the al Hawl refugee camp in northern Syria and in #Idlib.
Their manpower potential has increased in recent years due to the #IslamicState adventure and they have additional potential stockpile of manpower in #Syria - in the al Hawl refugee camp in northern Syria and in #Idlib.
(18/20)
11. It is too early to bury #AlQaeda and its affiliates, and certainly #ISIS and its affiliates, and those who act on their inspiration and on their behalf, despite the attacks and counterterrorism operations they sustain.
11. It is too early to bury #AlQaeda and its affiliates, and certainly #ISIS and its affiliates, and those who act on their inspiration and on their behalf, despite the attacks and counterterrorism operations they sustain.
(19/20)
12. Regarding the claim of Israeli responsibility for the targeted killing: I as the general public have no idea whether it has a merit. Yet it seems that the American account with Abdullah is larger and more substantial than Israel’s.
12. Regarding the claim of Israeli responsibility for the targeted killing: I as the general public have no idea whether it has a merit. Yet it seems that the American account with Abdullah is larger and more substantial than Israel’s.
(20/20)
If one looks at the targeted killing of Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah in the broader context of US targeted killing policy against senior al-Qaeda operatives responsible for the attacks against it, the inference on intention and responsibility seems more solid.
If one looks at the targeted killing of Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah in the broader context of US targeted killing policy against senior al-Qaeda operatives responsible for the attacks against it, the inference on intention and responsibility seems more solid.
