The @UN has quietly published its 2021 budget request for @UNITAMS. It offers the clearest picture yet of what to expect (or not expect) from the newest UN peace operation.

A Saturday night thread on the details along with some thoughts/questions (1/x)

https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/75/6%20(SECT.%203)/ADD.7

@UNITAMS will have an ambitious mandate (see S/RES/2524) but a relatively small financial envelope of approximately $34 million, seventh largest of UN political missions in 2021 (2/x)

The mission have 269 civilian staff, sixth largest of UN political missions. Importantly @UNITAMS will also have a police component of 21 individual police officers deployed across different locations.

The UN is planning for a 50% vacancy rate for the year (3/x)

@UNITAMS will largely be capital-based: appx. 68% of staff will be in Khartoum, 17% in Darfur, 9% in the Two Areas, and 5% in East Sudan. The 21 IPOs will be deployed to Khartoum and across Darfur (4/x)

The budget offers some suggestion of how @UNITAMS will priortize the non-good offices role and international coordination parts of its mandate: the political transition + peace agreement, human rights and civilian protection feature prominently (5/x)

Peacebuilding will be a huge part of continued @UN support to Sudan, but @UNITAMS will have a small operational role in this, with a budget of $1 million for peacebuilding programming in the Two Areas. (6/x)

There is no programmatic funding for @UNITAMS to do peacebuilding work in Darfur, but it will work with the UNCT to create a joint peacebuilding programme. The UN also envisions a new multi-partner trust fund and complementary PBF support (7/x)

This gives us a birds-eye view @UNITAMS will look like on the ground.

The concept is based on important assumptions about the current situation in Sudan, and about UNITAMS receiving significant operational support from @unamidnews through July '21 (8/x)

So what stands out and what does this approach suggest?

Relationships will be key for opening space for the UN to engage, especially outside of Khartoum

UNITAMS' success in sustaining inclusive civic dialogue on peace and governance might be its strongest value-add (9/x)

The mission structure does not reflect the 'whole of spectrum' approach and innovation that inspired its mandate or early planning

The drop-off in UN presence in Darfur will be stark, and the UNCT will be saddled with significant responsibilities across the country (10/x)

There will be a lot of political attention (and pressure) on the mission's human rights + civilian protection efforts, and on the UNCT protection cluster.

Focusing support towards Sudanese police forces is a pragmatic, but how quickly can it be scaled up? (11/x)

Securing peacebuilding funding is going to be a tall order, especially with other demands for humanitarian, development, and macro-economic support.

UNITAMS will need to undertake a communications campaign to explain its mandate and manage expectations in year one. (12/x)

The nearly five-month delay in appointing an SRSG/DSRSG has already hampered the mission's startup and will impact mandate delivery into 2021.

Can UNAMID still provide the anticipated operational support to UNITAMS if it is mandated to end on Dec 31? (13/x)

And how does this concept change if the escalating conflict in Ethiopia spills over into Sudan and impacts the country's security situation?

These are some issues that I'll follow over the coming weeks, especially when reading the imminent UN/AU report on @unamidnews (14/14)

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