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The Battle of Ia Drang began OTD in 1965, the first big clash for US forces in Vietnam and the litmus test for the #airmobility concept after more than a decade of theorizing & bureaucratic fights. Here's some context on the concept, the battle, & the #ArmyAviation side of things
Leaving aside the McNamara memos and the Howze Board, which are widely known, the 11th Air Assault Division was the unit responsible for testing the airmobility concept. It wasn't made up completely of aviation zealots, but it was led by a number of aggressive air-minded officers
The CO, Harry WO Kinnard, was already well known (he suggested the “Nuts!” response at Bastogne) and wasn't seen as an empire builder. But in Feb. 1963, he'd just left a position inside the same OSD office from which airmobility zealots exerted enormous influence on Army policy
Another 11th AAD airmobility diehard, George “Phip” Seneff believed its failure meant going "back to flying Piper Cubs, if we have that much left." The Army & the nation would "lose one of the things that...can mean the difference between victory and defeat in future land combat”
John Stockton was a well-intentioned but unconventional air cav visionary. He inspired incredible loyalty, but his insubordination was legion and ultimately cost him a promising career. Along the way he revived the Cav Stetson and is the basis of LTC Kilgore in Apocalypse Now.
With other like-minded & ambitious officers & men, the 11th gave form to a new concept. The airmobility div. sought to combine command & control, artillery, ground forces, rockets, comms, and support in one unit using organic aircraft, and then fight alone while sustaining itself
After extensive testing, the situation in Vietnam influenced DoD’s decision to field the division. The provincial capitals in the Central Highlands were key hubs of gov't control. Protecting them required mobile units that could pursue elusive insurgents across rough terrain
6/15/1965, the LBJ admin approved activating the 11th AAD as the reflagged 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). After sending helicopters in 1961, the Army's aviation program was again the locus of an expanding US commitment in SE Asia. It had only 8 weeks to become combat-ready.
One of the glaring critical shortages was personnel. Most of its authorized 15,800 officers and men were ground troops in 8 maneuver battalions. The most critical shortages, though, were trained aviators and aviation maintenance personnel for its 434 aircraft, mostly helicopters.
Pilots from all over the Army received orders to Benning and received training on the tactics & procedures developed by Kinnard's 11th AAD. The shortage of Warrant Officer pilots was a crisis that endured throughout the war. Only 218 Army UH-1D slicks existed at the end of 1964.
In response, in August McNamara announced a 60% increase in Bell UH-1 production and 100% increase in CH-47s. The rate would continue to rise. Vietnam birthed the airmobile division, but it also created a massive new boom for the helicopter industry.
Westmoreland’s orders to the 1st Cav when it arrived in RVN were to find, fix, & destroy the enemy threatening Plei Me & Pleiku. The NVA & Americans shared similar operational objectives: draw the other into battle, not for territorial gain but principally to inflict casualties
Given free rein to locate and engage the enemy, the 1st Cavalry caught up with the North Vietnamese in the Ia Drang Valley in what was supposed to be a routine operation near the Cambodian border. Airmobile doctrine was informed by prior experience in RVN and the 11th AAD tests.
Preparatory arty began 20 mins before the scheduled arrival of the first 16 UH-1s of the 229th Assault Helicopter Bn. Combat experience dictated flying at 2,000 to stay above small arms. Troops were staged 14 miles away at Plei Me, requiring multiple lifts to move 1st Bn, 7th Cav
Stateside theorizing/testing paid off well. UH-1s carried troops into battle. CH-47s lifted supporting batteries. H-13 scouts sent info to ground units. Gunships targeted the enemy. Officers coordinated the battle from the air. USAF a/c provided close air support, including B-52s
Many in the DoD were reassured by the outcome. The Pleiku campaign showcased airmobility & helicopters' survivability while avoiding disaster common to a first outing. The "acid test" was a high-profile proving ground that seemed to pay off years of effort, concept become reality
Airmobility became critical to the Army's war & was highly adaptable. Units, machines, & doctrine fused to create an airmobile capability for most infantry units. Ultimately, there's a line from Ia Drang to the air arm becoming one of the Army’s most modern institutions today.
