Indeed, there is always a subset of people that get very sensitive about what I call "ace worship." And the neat-and-tidy "air war in the Pacific was over after [battle]" is alluring, but also badly misrepresents what actually occurred - a drawn out, grinding slugfest. https://twitter.com/itsCH33F/status/1327107373299683328

Particularly in 1943, when many works lose the plot because there aren't the same kind of titanic clashes of 1942 or 1944. This is problematic for understanding of the air war, because it misconstrues how much fight the Japanese air services still had in them right into 1944.

Implicitly, or often explicitly, histories will argue that the Japanese air services were qualitatively done, at latest, by the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, which is simply not supported by the performance of the Japanese air services over the next year of the war in the air.

A more nuanced understanding of the air war in the Pacific also undercuts the "Japanese supermen" myth, by placing the early lopsided victories in proper context. The Japanese were good, yes, but there were also other reasons behind the overwhelming success.

It also underlines how difficult it was to break Japanese air power, and how good the Allies had to be to ultimately succeed. The IJNAS and IJAAS were not mickey-mouse outfits propped up by a handful of experienced pilots that fell apart after a few months.

Japanese air power finally began to collapse in 1944, as Allied victory tallies grew increasingly lopsided, but it continued to remain a serious threat right to the surrender. Special attack tactics were the most striking, and effective, but conventional attacks also continued.

This honestly feeds into my own research on American interwar intelligence assessments, because it undermines some of the points made in the newer historiography (Kennedy, Ferris, Ford, and me included). I have a lot to think long and hard about.