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Lot's of the chatter of EU overplaying it's hand's highly overestimating a) UK's stability as a state, b) overestimating Johnson's position within the party when substantial downsides occur (e.g. UK's integrity as a state is in question) & c) underestimate the patience of EU. /1
The debate assumes that UK is in principle stable, that it can not just buffer any economic short, medium and long term shock but that state institutions who are already under stress (in particular looking at tensions within NI but also SCO-UK) can withstand no deal. /2
That strikes me a wee bit as unfounded optimism, especially post COVID. While probably not as important for EU now (point being here is indeed adhering to red lines), it may become "handy" later, also regarding USA (a clear see border won't go down well with Unionists). /3
People here seem to assume as long as WA is implemented USA stays out of the equation. That's nonsense in two ways. They want to see peace in NI and they see UK as the one having to bear the costs. Unfair? Maybe, but tough luck. /4
And "thankfully" UK does currently so much to undermine trust in even adhering existing agreements that almost any turmoil is going to be blamed on them. If you behave as baddie don't wonder you are the first to be blamed (whether unjustly or not). /5
And even if UK now adheres to it, there is a good chance that current moves encouraged Unionists & Loyalists to be a bit bolder regarding the sea border. Any turmoil there will almost certainly (at least outside UK & within UK outside Leaver milieus) be put on HMG's doorstep. /6
And this is just one major friction, and given the history of violence there is even a risk of turmoil outside NI (on UK side) if it is badly handled (looking at the current handling I see this as a serious risk; CC @KeohaneDan). The other one is SCO elections. /7
EU doesn't even need to openly endorse anything but making friendly tones to put oil in the very British fire. Again, those frictions are ignored when debating of no deal risks. And what about general social risks? /8
I'm probably not the only one who wonders whether an interplay through serious mishaps on the border (e.g. major delays, some shortages) is combined with medium and long term economic repercussions and COVID induced recession. /9
Tories did so far a good job on deepening any social divide, so how likely is it that the public co-incidentally rallies behind them knowing there rather poor performance from this year? /10
Those points are all pointing to a substantially and transparently bad "hand". Question is whether those frictions play a role. I suspect in this moment, the answer is "no". /11
The redlines are the bare minimum from EU side, below that you open a can of worms within EU's internal dynamics. Any conceivable deal with UK can't offset this. The other point is the need to reflect in any deal power asymmetry. UK is not an equal power-wise. /12
This is particularly reflected if you look at polls how national audiences see the Brexit negotiations. The more attention they pay, the greater the hardline stance. I wouldn't even say it's anti-British, it's just pro-selfinterest. /13
Making themselves looking like fools over the last years combined w/ anti-European resentments to create sympathies either. National media & political debates'll & do also play a role and again, the sentiment here isn't for softening (i.e. in Germany). /14 https://twitter.com/APHClarkson/status/1326607084423667719?s=20
Why is this important if EU isn't yet there to exploit the frictions? Well, first UK's leadership and their commentary don't acknowledge them yet. So you can't really exploit costs if those are not recognised as danger yet. /15
Second, there is hope of realism and a decent deal. Obviously, decent here means well in EU's orbit and no challenge to EU's power whatsoever. EU isn't up for a aggressive competition. /16
However, national debates here play a role and restrict wriggle room. Which leads us to point three, EU is indeed patient and there is an awareness that no deal is not sustainable in particular for UK. /17
So initial no deal is seen as a problem, but a temporary and a manageable one - even without looking at the frictions. If the frictions, however, get obviously (economic performance, mishaps, turmoil in NI + SCO elections), it seems unlikely that EU won't exploit it. /18
In other words, UK will get a deal so that it can diffuse some of the issues somewhat (e.g. with Unionists and Loyalists and/or Republicans and Nationalists, with soft supporters of SCO indy) but EU will ask for a price. And almost certainly that's not decreasing over time. /19
Question here is whether it is a miscalculation: Who knows? But there is a trajectory in NI and SCO which points precisely towards the outlined direction, and the lack of preparedness on post Brexit + COVID problems to come seems not confidence inducing. /20
Which leads me to the final point, given the trajectory and structural weaknesses on UK side, how comes that EU overplays its cards? It puts a heavy price tag on it but looking at the risks in UK, it's certainly a "higher price" UK may need to pay when no deal manifests. 21/21
PS: One may add that nothing has changed and UK still doesn't get the concept of being in a asymmetrical power relationship. Those kind of arguments have been made over and over, but they are not just not understood but the stability bias is happily reinforced.
