This article by @lcbattista provides wonderful fodder for debate. But fundamentally, I think the note of caution here is warranted. https://eltoque.com/victoria-de-biden-no-garantiza-una-nueva-normalizacion/?fbclid=IwAR0ycVGBc9F0xs4cp1QyEjpGYewXN7VhLnU6wfeLbWlSZLwd-iWudUFGX1M

Most ppl in Cuba are understandably breathing sighs of relief with Biden's election. ME TOO. Anything is better than Trump. And the Biden campaign has pledged to revert the most damaging parts of Trump policy that hurt the Cuban people most directly.

But to go from there to another high-profile push toward normalization, as under Obama, is not guaranteed, and it may not even be likely—certainly not right away.

In addition to the points raised in the article, I would add the following as mitigating factors.

1. The regional environment has changed. In 2014, part of what pushed Obama to do what he did was that Latin American governments were pushing him to do so as a means of shoring up relations with the hemisphere as a whole.

Since then, there's been a significant turn to the right in the hemisphere. It's not universal—witness MAS and the Peronistas being back in power in Bolivia and Argentina—but I don't think you have, immediately, such a strong regional consensus pushing Washington to act.

2. Given election results in Miami-Dade, I worry some in the Biden camp will conclude that Cuba policy is a domestic political loser. That's a simplification at best. The hard swing toward Trump is hardly explained by some Cuban-Americans' aversion 2 normalization alone.

(Obama never did a good enough job cultivating a lasting constituency for his policy in Miami, it's true. But we've seen all the postmortems on dismal national Biden campaign attn to Latinos in Miami-Dade, including Cubans. Cubans don't vote on foreign policy anyway...)

Nonetheless, Biden's advisors could conclude that a big normalization push is not worth the trouble, especially if they are trying to pivot away from an impoverished Trump Lat-Am policy that was focused on Cuba and Venezuela over and above almost every other country.

3. What U.S. president wants to come into office and basically just re-do the policy of their predecessor? All things being equal, there will be a natural impulse for the Biden administration to want to distinguish its policy toward Cuba in some way.

4. There's (frighteningly) still 2 months left of the Trump administration. There's a lot of damage they can still do that can impede a quick return to normalization after January.

We've already seen reports they are going to do things on Iran that make it all the more difficult to get back to the nuclear deal. Similarly, they could do things on Cuba that seriously gum up the works for almost everything else.

For ex: following through on threat to put Cuba back on state sponsors of terrorism list, which to get Cuba off of again (required for going back to some Obama-era stuff) would necessitate, by regulation, a months-long process of review.

5. But I think the most immediate obstacle is just the size of the steaming pile of Biden will inherit from Trump on all kinds of matters foreign and domestic. Covid and the economy are bound to occupy the bulk of his time.

Meanwhile, rebuilding relationships with traditional allies will take up most oxygen in terms of foreign policy.

In this environment, could be very difficult to get Cuba to rise to the top of the pile, other than to roll back the worst Trump measures in a piecemeal way.

All of which is to say: if defenders of normalization in the US and Cuba want to return to that path in a more robust fashion, or to go further than Obama was able to, they have to start making their case early and often.

On the merits, all of the reasons that made the policy smart/just/necessary in 2014 remain. But politically, Cuba may have to make it worth Washington's while in a different way this time, though Havana, I recognize, will not like this premise in the slightest.