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Today's agreement may turn another bloody page in the tragedy that is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Setting emotions aside, here are couple of quick points on Russian calculus and handling of the issue - and some possible implications for
standing in the Caucasus.
Today's agreement may turn another bloody page in the tragedy that is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Setting emotions aside, here are couple of quick points on Russian calculus and handling of the issue - and some possible implications for
standing in the Caucasus.
2/ For many Russian decision-makers, resumption of hostilities in NK was a matter of "when" rather than "if." The Kremlin took note of 2016 war, and the conclusion was that time is on Azerbaijan's side if Baku becomes determined to use force.
3/ This is why Russia had encouraged Yerevan to become more flexible, and has always been clear that the 
military alliance covers only internationally recognized Armenian territory, but not NK - a point reinstated very clearly by @MID_RF on 10/31 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4411939
military alliance covers only internationally recognized Armenian territory, but not NK - a point reinstated very clearly by @MID_RF on 10/31 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4411939
4/ By Moscow's assessment, @NikolPashinyan's way of handling the conflict and relations with Baku have been extremely risky since 2018, leaving Russia with increasingly fewer options to prevent a military scenario. As the war resumed, it had left Moscow with few good options.
5/ Beyond a very clear determination not to fight a war in NK to compensate for Yerevan's own missteps (as viewed by Moscow), Russia had its own reasons to maintain good ties with Azerbaijan, very eloquently explained recently by my colleague @baunov https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82933
6/ And then there is a very complicated relationship with Turkey that matters much for Moscow's broader game in the Middle East and Northern Africa. For more context tune in to my recent conversation with dear colleagues @Tom_deWaal & @sinanulgen1 https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82963
7/ Today's deal announced by Putin, @presidentaz & @NikolPashinyan in many ways addresses core Russian interests in the conflict, and is perhaps the best outcome (at least in short term) Moscow could get out of the situation. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384
8/ The deal is brokered and signed by Russia and the two conflicting powers, showing Moscow's centrality to diplomatic resolution (with Turkey in the back, but with no formal role, which is an important nuance). And no role for 
, which is important in the Kremlin's worldview.
, which is important in the Kremlin's worldview.
9/ Russia managed to prevent full defeat of NK (and the likely additional amount of human suffering - on top of the tragedy that these 6 weeks have brought) at a time, when the situation on the battleground looked increasingly advantageous for 
after capture of Shusha.
after capture of Shusha.
10/ Russia has put its 2000 peacekeepers in NK - something that Moscow wanted to do back in 1994, but was unable to. There will be no Turkish armed peacekeepers, which is very important for Moscow.
11/ Presence of the peacekeepers (in Moscow's view) is a guarantee that will not be tempted to resume the war and capture all of NK territory. The Kremlin is sure that @presidentaz took note of what happened after shelling of peacekeepers in 2008 in South Ossetia.
peacekeepers (in Moscow's view) is a guarantee that will not be tempted to resume the war and capture all of NK territory. The Kremlin is sure that @presidentaz took note of what happened after shelling of peacekeepers in 2008 in South Ossetia.
12/ Ties with Baku have not been damaged, although much stronger 
influence in Azerbaijan and broader region became very visible. However, growth of Ankara's presence in the region was in the making for years, and Moscow sees it as an inevitable downside of the new order.
influence in Azerbaijan and broader region became very visible. However, growth of Ankara's presence in the region was in the making for years, and Moscow sees it as an inevitable downside of the new order.
13/ What is very important for the Kremlin is diminished role of the West, which was mainly self-inflicetd by lack of focus and regular process under @realDonaldTrump, as @pstronski explains https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/14/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-is-bad-omen-pub-82959
14/ Finally, there is Armenia. The sense of Russian betrayal and level of emotions is explainable and expected by Moscow (and it might weaken or end Pashinyan's rule). However, has few realistic alternative options as banking its security on Russia.
has few realistic alternative options as banking its security on Russia.
15/ As always, my @CarnegieRussia colleague @DmitriTrenin brilliantly sums it up - there is a new regional order in the making, with Russia still indispensable, growth of Turkish role, and diminishing relevance of the West. https://twitter.com/DmitriTrenin/status/1326096852429787137?s=20
16/ Moscow is satisfied with this outcome, given the options that it has. And I haven't met any senior Russian official who believes that Moscow will ever be able to be in full control in the South Caucasus with no other powers in the mix. It's more about balance than dominance.
17/ The whole situation tells us something new about the way Moscow exercises foreign policy, including in the post-Soviet space. There is a better calibration of tools to address regional crisis, and somewhat more relaxed and realistic view on Russian aims. END
