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As the job market begins, a central theme in the minds of both candidates and employers is the current recession. We worry that fewer jobs will lead to lower wages and fewer opportunities for market entrants.
This is also my research agenda... a thread (1/n)
As the job market begins, a central theme in the minds of both candidates and employers is the current recession. We worry that fewer jobs will lead to lower wages and fewer opportunities for market entrants.
This is also my research agenda... a thread (1/n)
Unfortunately, this concern isn't misplaced. Literature shows labor market entry in a recession can harm wages for 5-20 years, a scarring effect.
We expect wages would be lower during a recession, but it's unclear why this effect persists after conditions improve. (2/n)
We expect wages would be lower during a recession, but it's unclear why this effect persists after conditions improve. (2/n)
One theory is this effect persists because scarred workers do not transition to better-paying jobs later. But why?
In my job market paper, I examine how salary history disclosure in hiring discourages job mobility for scarred workers.
http://www.joshmask.com/research/ (3/n)
In my job market paper, I examine how salary history disclosure in hiring discourages job mobility for scarred workers.
http://www.joshmask.com/research/ (3/n)
As a former recruiter, I knew that salary history was a common tool used to screen candidates. As a researcher, I wondered if this practice also perpetuated this scarring effect. If you're getting screened on lower pay, it's hard to break out of the cycle. (4/n)
I use the implementation of Salary History Ban laws (SHBs), or laws passed in various states that ban the discussion of salary history in hiring, to test how salary history disclosure affects job mobility and wages for scarred workers. (5/n)
I find that enacting SHBs increases hourly wages, weekly earnings, job mobility, and unemployment-to-employment for scarred workers relative to non-scarred workers. I also show these laws reverse nearly 70% of the original scarring effect for early-career workers. (6/n)
Overall, SHBs appear to improve labor market outcomes for scarred workers. However, I also find that SHBs lower job mobility (J2J) for non-scarred workers. This is plausible if higher-paid individuals are unable to signal their wages to new employers. (7/n)
Therefore, policymakers should consider unintended consequences when implementing these policies.
Thanks for reading. If you like this paper, I also have a paper that studies the consequences of immigrating during a recession. Hope to see some of you in interviews! (8/n)
Thanks for reading. If you like this paper, I also have a paper that studies the consequences of immigrating during a recession. Hope to see some of you in interviews! (8/n)
cc: @Claudia_Sahm, @jenniferdoleac, and @arpitrage as you all expressed interest in this paper when I referenced it in past tweets.
