Read on Twitter
I will fully endorse your position that that is not evidence of Pakistani state support in sheltering AQ. I will equally say that there isn’t any evidence of Iran sheltering AQ leaders. In fact they arrested those leaders and continue to keep them under tight supervision. https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1324652584909590529
But the point I was making was besides whether there is support or not. It was to do with the type of evidence relied on in establishing ongoing Taliban-AQ collaboration.
To clarify my point, I will summarise as following:
To clarify my point, I will summarise as following:
EVIDENCE TYPE ONE - Death of AQ leaders in TB territory: One type of evidence used to support ongoing AQ-TB collaboration is that senior AQ leaders continue to be killed in Taliban territory. The rationale being that this is proof of ongoing cooperation.
I simply argued that this type of evidence by itself ALONE is not enough. Otherwise we could argue that the fact that senior AQ leaders being killed in Pakistani territory (such as Abbotabad or Waziristan) would be evidence of some form of collaboration.
As you agreed, these death alone are not sufficient for such a causal link. Similarly, the fact that Abu Muhammad al-Masri might have been killed in Iran is not sufficient proof of AQ-Iran collaboration.
There can be other explanations such as AAA being under a form of strict supervision following a long period of imprisonment. This arrangement being reached after AQ abducted Iranian diplomats and then negotiated such a deal with Iran. So again, this alone wouldn't be sufficient.
The fact of the matter is that where a government or a group has weak territorial control and lacks capacity to strictly monitor individuals hiding, emergence of such person in such territories is not enough evidence to establish cause for claims of collaboration.
So in all 3 cases, we'd need further evidence to establish ongoing collaboration. Eg: if evidence emerges that Taliban would actively protecting these individuals (for example they were inside the compound where these individuals were killed then we can make a much stronger case.
Two points can be made on this latter points:
1. Whenever ANDSF or ISAF forces conduct raids in TB-controlled areas, naturally we can expect TB casualties as the latter actively defends their positions when the former enters their territory.
1. Whenever ANDSF or ISAF forces conduct raids in TB-controlled areas, naturally we can expect TB casualties as the latter actively defends their positions when the former enters their territory.
2. Apart from claims, so far we have not seen any evidence that TB fighters or commanders were present with AQ individuals in the same compound or vicinity when the latter were killed.
So what other type of evidence is available?
So what other type of evidence is available?
EVIDENCE TYPE TWO - Evidence of communications between the Taliban and AQ: Another type of evidence that is presented for ongoing AQ-TB collaboration is that there are communications between the two groups.
Eg the Tayyab Agha letters to AQ (that were then passed onwards to OBL). This IMO is strong circumstantial evidence but is it enough? Well we also have evidence of Iranian communicating with AQ (especially when the latter negotiated the release or bail of some of their leaders).
Similarly, we also have evidence of ISI chief communicating with AQ (to negotiate a possible cessation of hostilities in Waziristan).
There might even be instances of US government officials communicating with AQ for various reasons or ISIL and AQ communication for limited purposes. In such cases, again, this type of evidence alone would not necessitate collaboration.
So what does it all mean then?
Well we know for sure that the Taliban had some form of collaboration with AQ even if they didn’t publicly acknowledge such collaboration. That collaboration would be the only basis on which the US and TB would have negotiated the Doha Agreement.
Well we know for sure that the Taliban had some form of collaboration with AQ even if they didn’t publicly acknowledge such collaboration. That collaboration would be the only basis on which the US and TB would have negotiated the Doha Agreement.
I would even argue that even following this deal, there will be continued communication (perhaps even collaboration) between the two groups. As it is unlikely that TB will be taken up arms against AQ in the near future....
the only other means of removing a projection of AQ threat outside AFG is to continue to communicate with AQ and start taking steps to limit AQ’s capacity in AFG.
We have seen some evidence of this where TB is communicating with AQ and other foreign fighters to limit their activities or at least bring it under tighter control.
Couple of things to note:
1. The agreement does NOT require Taliban to publicly break with AQ. If AQ continues to threaten the US then TB is obligated to make it clear to AQ that they have ‘no place in Afghanistan’.
1. The agreement does NOT require Taliban to publicly break with AQ. If AQ continues to threaten the US then TB is obligated to make it clear to AQ that they have ‘no place in Afghanistan’.
2. The agreement specifically includes a clause giving TB ability to differentiate between those AQ (and others) who continue to threaten US and allies & those that no longer pose such a threat. Those that don’t (Part II para 4) can continue to remain in AFG as refugees.
So given this context, the evidence that AQ leaders continue to hide in territories controlled or contested by the TB AND of TB communications with AQ alone aren't sufficient to argue for the type of collaboration that it would breach the letter (not spirit) of the Agreement.
I would end by highlighting the point again that it is likely that there will be continued communication between the two groups and even some form of collaboration (so long as the collaboration does not breach the LETTER of the Doha Deal).
In fact, I would argue that the TB would be keen to privately highlight this continued collaboration to show it will not break with AQ until the US has fulfilled all aspects of the Doha deal including TB blacklists, releasing remaining prisoners and withdrawal per d agreed date.
Only after these conditions are met would TB likely completely break with AQ. Although possible they may continue to shelter some who have given up on threatening US and allies while taking a harder stance agains those that continue to use Afghanistan for such threat projection.
