When SSCI looked at social media amplification of false and inflammatory messaging in the 2016 election, online influence operations and radicalization were relatively unfamiliar issues for the public and lawmakers. That's no longer true. https://twitter.com/LindsayPGorman/status/1324343787628408832

Platforms' use of detailed personal profiles to target users for false and extremist content is an ongoing, urgent issue for democracy, national security, and our ability to live in a thriving, civil society.

These harms to individuals are every bit as real, and probably more damaging, than traditional antitrust measures like the price that consumers pay for a service; antitrust investigations need to look at consumer harm thru a lens that includes individualized targeting for disinfo

Content moderation discussions need to look not just at Sec. 230 and at the speech that's posted, but also at platforms' use of algorithms to drive people to content that is more enraging - and therefore more engaging - as a profit-driven business strategy.

In other words, should law and policy distinguish between platforms' current immunity for what gets *posted*, and some degree of platform accountability for what gets *boosted*?

When platforms actively profile individual users to drive them to certain content in order to maximize the platforms' profit, that seems different than passively allowing users to post. (It seems different ethically and morally; should it also be treated as different legally?)

Takeaways from the role of platforms in disinformation in 2016 and 2020?
Fool us once, shame on you. Fool us twice, shame on us.

Legislators, regulators & individuals shd be looking at a full mix of approaches (antitrust, federal privacy laws, public awareness campaigns, Sec. 230, content moderation, personal choices re platform use, etc.) so platforms' benefits can flourish while we mitigate their harms.