1/ "Militant Maritime Operations Along #Africa’s Eastern Coast." Interesting new @WarOnTheRocks essay examining 
by @JTylerLycan @C_Faulkner_UCF @austincdoctor https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/making-waves-militant-maritime-operations-along-africas-eastern-coast/


2/ Anyway, for a distraction it gives me an excuse to talk about #AMISOM's boats and its little maritime component! 


Here's one! Source for below
is Fighting for Peace in #Somalia
. https://eunavfor.eu/amisom-and-smpu-training-with-eu-team/






3/ From its start in 2007, #AMISOM had two maritime sectors (north & south). But initially only 3 rigid & inflatable boats, which were often inoperable. Here are a couple from c.2008.
4/ In its early years, #AMISOM’s main, heavy logistics supplies (e.g. APCs & tanks) came via ship every fortnight from #Mombasa, #Kenya
. The AU asked #NATO & @EUNAVFOR to provide an escort in case the ship was attacked. https://eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-escorts-amisom-vessel/

5/ By 2009, #AMISOM was also reportedly worried about #AlShabaab conducting a USS Cole-type attack from the water i.e. where they might load small boats with explosives to render #Mogadishu’s seaport unusable by large resupply vessels.
6/ By 2011, #AMISOM’s plan was to conduct limited maritime security ops & support land ops e.g. interdicting #AlShabaab logistic resupply into #Kismayo, Haradhere, Marka & Barawe, & protecting sea lines of communication. But AMISOM’s few small boats weren't able to do this.
7/ By 2012, #AMISOM was worried about #AlShabaab attacking flights into/out of #Mogadishu airport from the sea. So its maritime
#UPDF marines did some patrolling. But you'll see from the map, @UNSOS_ had no budget to support maritime ops at the time! https://amisom-au.org/wp-content/cache/page_enhanced/amisom-au.org/2012_12_14_amisom_marines_h/_index.html_gzip
