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I suspect Ash'arism might be more compatible with pluralism than, say, Mu'tazilism, Catholicism, and many strains of secular liberalism – and might explain why historically Muslim societies were often more pluralist (eg the millet system) than these alternatives. /1
If you believe that most or every moral issue can in principle be settled decisively by pure reason alone, then you're likely to seek to homogenously impose that on society. /2
"This is the right and the good, knowable universally, and the arguments I have made in favour of it are utterly compelling to every reasonable person who has considered them in good faith." /3
The natural implication of holding this view being that only one social order, only one set of permissions and prohibitions, is legitimate.
And hence, polities impose a uniform legal, political, and cultural system on their inhabitants. /4
And hence, polities impose a uniform legal, political, and cultural system on their inhabitants. /4
Even where moral-rationalist ideologies wane, this mode of thinking about the right and the good can persist – and so, say, the post-Catholic or post-liberal society remains the assumption that politics is about working out a homogenous code to impose. /5
By contrast, a scepticism about the capacity of pure reason to decisively determine even extremely major moral disputes means that one will anticipate that reasonable and well-meaning will inevitably have profound disagreements. /6
An implication of this might be to restrain the frontiers of the legal-political order, to allow individuals and groups room to follow their own particular understandings of the good.
This is the route some Protestants and some strains of liberalism took. /7
This is the route some Protestants and some strains of liberalism took. /7
An alternative implication of this might be to have multiple legal-political orders existing within one overarching polity, or perhaps even crossing over multiple polities.
This was by and large the route the pre-modern Muslim world took. /8
This was by and large the route the pre-modern Muslim world took. /8
Eg in the Ottoman Empire, each religious group had its own 'millet', where they had significant autonomy to make their own laws for their members. /9
There's an extent to which the US pursued both approaches.
The Bill of Rights restrains all levels of government, and the federal government faces further restrictions still.
But then states and localities have room to craft their own differing legal-political orders. /10
The Bill of Rights restrains all levels of government, and the federal government faces further restrictions still.
But then states and localities have room to craft their own differing legal-political orders. /10
Although it should be noted that the US to some extent embraces the moral-rationalist view, believing that certain issues are beyond good faith reasonable disagreement, and seeking to homogenously impose them. /11
Moreover, in practice, all systems are going to have to blend the homogeneous and the pluralist.
A polity must have some shared legal-political principles in order to be a polity at all and not anarchy.
And no polity can micromanage every single choice its members make. /12
A polity must have some shared legal-political principles in order to be a polity at all and not anarchy.
And no polity can micromanage every single choice its members make. /12
Four caveats to my theory:
1. Ash'arism accepts pure reason underdetermines moral knowledge, but not that it underdetermines knowledge of the truth of Islam.
All reasonable and well-meaning people exposed to Islam presented in an adequate way should realise its truth./13
1. Ash'arism accepts pure reason underdetermines moral knowledge, but not that it underdetermines knowledge of the truth of Islam.
All reasonable and well-meaning people exposed to Islam presented in an adequate way should realise its truth./13
From there, whilst they accept plenty of scope for reasonable disagreement (ikhtilaf) over moral (shar'i) issues, this is within tightly constrained bounds.
So, ultimately, they are moral rationalists too – they just have more steps to get there. /14
So, ultimately, they are moral rationalists too – they just have more steps to get there. /14
However, I don't think this undermines my theory.
Ash'aris take it for granted that not everyone will be a Muslim as per God's decree, and hold to the Qur'anic maxim that "there is no compulsion in religion" (Qur'an 2:256). /15
Ash'aris take it for granted that not everyone will be a Muslim as per God's decree, and hold to the Qur'anic maxim that "there is no compulsion in religion" (Qur'an 2:256). /15
Their denial that pure reason can (directly) decisively settle moral debates means that they believe it inevitable different religious communities will have different moral beliefs and no hope of complete moral agreement. /16
Accordingly, the Ash'aris believe that religious and moral diversity is inevitable, and that it is prohibited to use compulsion to change this.
This naturally leads to support for legal-political pluralism. /17
This naturally leads to support for legal-political pluralism. /17
2. A thorough going moral rationalist (ie someone who believes pure reason is sufficient to provide us with moral knowledge and decisively settle moral debates) can still coherently support legal-political pluralism. /18
For instance, they could hold that the moral truths delivered to them by pure reason are that legal-political pluralism is good.
Or they could hold that, whilst ideally there would be a homogeneous order, for practical reasons pluralism is desirable. /19
Or they could hold that, whilst ideally there would be a homogeneous order, for practical reasons pluralism is desirable. /19
Eg because we can't trust the goodness or competence of those who would preside over a homogeneous order and so should disperse such power or restrain it; or because people in society are irrational and so will disagree regardless, and it's better to not coerce them. /20
3. There might be significant limits to the extent an Ash'ari would support pluralism.
Eg they could construe "no compulsion in religion" narrowly: not seeing it as permitting blasphemy, and/or limiting it to prohibiting conversion into Islam but not out of Islam, etc. /21
Eg they could construe "no compulsion in religion" narrowly: not seeing it as permitting blasphemy, and/or limiting it to prohibiting conversion into Islam but not out of Islam, etc. /21
Or, irrespective of how broadly they construe the maxim, they could hold non-Muslims and non-Muslim moral systems as second class, tolerating them but not putting them on an equal footing with Muslims and Islamic morality. /22
4. Even though Ash'arism coincides with certain political conclusions (ie pluralism) whilst alternatives have a harder job at justifying those conclusions, this has no bearing on whether Ash'arism is in fact true. /23
*Unless* we have reason to believe independently of Ash'arism that pluralism is correct, in which case our credence in Ash'arism should go up and our credence in alternatives should go down. /24
And remember: Ash'aris believe such a reason can't exist!
As we can have no knowledge of moral truths independently of knowledge of the truth of Islam, and thus can have no knowledge of the truth of pluralism independently of our knowledge of the truth of Islam. /25
As we can have no knowledge of moral truths independently of knowledge of the truth of Islam, and thus can have no knowledge of the truth of pluralism independently of our knowledge of the truth of Islam. /25
I happen to think that the arguments Ash'aris make in favour of their school of thought are very strong, but I also think many arguments their opponents make (eg those of Ibn Taymiyya) are very strong too. /26
It's no secret that I like pluralism, but I'm agnostic on whether a meta-ethics that (combined with the Qur'anic maxim of 2:256) naturally gets us there is correct.
Happily, as discussed above moral rationalists can also support pluralism.
Fin. 27/27
Happily, as discussed above moral rationalists can also support pluralism.
Fin. 27/27
Addendum 1: To an extent the pluralism - homogeneity dichotomy can be a false dichotomy.
If I want to spread pluralism, there's a sense in which I want the world to conform to my political vision, what I personally believe is right: ie pluralism
If I want to spread pluralism, there's a sense in which I want the world to conform to my political vision, what I personally believe is right: ie pluralism
Addendum 2: In this thread I argue that moral rationalism is i) a convenient tool for the powerful, and ii) inherently secularising when adopted as a political ideology.
(Although these social implications have no bearing on whether it is true or false.) https://twitter.com/Evollaqi/status/1292486090839007234?s=19
(Although these social implications have no bearing on whether it is true or false.) https://twitter.com/Evollaqi/status/1292486090839007234?s=19
