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Over time Taiwan's ability to exert control over the strait has eroded steadily. There used to be a time when, in the event of an invasion, the strait would be a "no-man's land," the site of a decisive air and naval battle.
From the 50s to the early 90s both the PLA and ROCF had each other on par, although the PRC had the edge in a more experienced indigenous arms industry. During the 90s both Taiwan and PRC sought to modernize the military in the way that many nations did a decade prior.
While Taiwan got off to a good start, namely with the IDF and some 4th gen aircraft the PRC shot forward. The lack of an experienced arms industry, because the government never pushed ambitious projects on them, forced Taiwan from now on to rely on foreign arms sales to catch up.
The cursed Taiwanese Cycle™. mediocre arms industry -> new threats from increasingly powerful PRC, able to exert higher level of diplomatic pressure -> reliance on foreign procurement, hindered by said diplomatic pressure -> arms industry lags -> weak overall defense
The purchase of many modern equipment by the PLA in the 90s supplemented their already robust arms industry. 30 years later Taiwan *still* doesn't have an advanced arms industry. We are the only country within our peers to not have developed a 3rd gen MBT, among other things.
This was especially disastrous for the navy, the country's first line of defense. It continues to field vastly outdated and vulnerable vessels, none of which carry a single VLS cell.
All ongoing projects to replace these started way too late, implying the existence of the state at the time of completion. This is such an important point, and I cannot stress it enough. They are a waste of money which could have been better used on near term projects.
It had already been pointed out that a complete restructuring of ROCN planning and doctrine, focusing on asymmetric warfare, was needed decades prior but these calls were not taken totally seriously. for reasons unknown domestic development is focusing on both.
To summarize, in the event of conflict, the navy is helpless. There are only two combat capable submarines which are arguably dated, and only four destroyers with vastly inferior air defense (no VLS). The remaining frigates also lack any serious AA capability at all.
In terms of asymmetrical capabilities, the stealth corvette class only entered serial production last year, 5 years (why??) since the first entered service; the remaining smaller missile/patrol boats add up to a total of less than 45.
Reiterating important point yet again: All major indigenous naval projects, accounting for R&D, completion, test, commission lie within or beyond the PLA's preferred time of attack. (now - very near future)
No planned modern vessels will play any role in the conflict.
No planned modern vessels will play any role in the conflict.
Example: Tuo Chiang- 1 prototype completed in 2014. 12 planned, none other completed
CSBC IDS (no prior experience in subs)/NCSIST ~7000t DDG- r&d + building + trials + commish (proto) + serial = 2077??
CSBC IDS (no prior experience in subs)/NCSIST ~7000t DDG- r&d + building + trials + commish (proto) + serial = 2077??
