I'm seeing lots of commentary on the state of #AlQaeda, 19yrs after 9/11 -- my take:

- Everything has changed since 2001; we can't judge AQ in 2020 by 2001 or even 2010 metrics.

AQ used to be a rigid organization -- it's now a widely dispersed & deeply decentralized movement

Osama #BinLaden was a charismatic leader that shaped #AlQaeda into a largely unified & single-minded organization.

Ayman al- #Zawahiri on the other hand is defiantly uncharismatic & increasingly disconnected -- AQ's followers worldwide are now pursuing semi-autonomous agendas.

The decentralization of #AlQaeda hasn't diminished the threat, it's changed it - #BinLaden's "far enemy" has declined in importance while the "near enemy" is now the overwhelming priority.

AQ affiliates have localized; embedding deeply in local conflicts, pursuing local agendas.

As local governance fails/recedes & dictatorial rule returns across swathes of the #MiddleEast, #Africa & #SouthAsia, the local agendas of #AlQaeda affiliates have become ever more potent -- but the "threat" is not to the U.S. homeland, but to allies & to international stability.

As #AlQaeda's decentralization & localization becomes a consolidated reality, #Zawahiri has very clearly struggled (or failed?) to re-assert his leadership.

Despite his best attempts to revitalize #AlQaeda's globalist agenda, his affiliates have not changed. One left altogether.

The longer #AlQaeda affiliates remain dedicated to strictly local agendas, the harder it will prove to extract, undermine & defeat them.

They're getting smarter too -- as conflict mediators in #Mali, tribal mobilizers in #Yemen & advocates of peaceful protest in #Algeria.

It's this localization trend that the U.S. & others need to be studying & worrying about. As "local" jihadists are ignored, the overall threat rises markedly.

It's significance is arguably proven by the fact that #ISIS appears to be copying the approach, particularly in #Africa.