1/ The Federal Republic of Nigeria is making its concluding arguments this morning in the ongoing mega-trial of Royal Dutch Shell, Eni and some of their most senior executives on charges of international corruption in the billion dollar OPL 245 deal. Livetweeting here. THREAD

2/ Many thanks go to @irpinvestigates and @Recommon who've set up a live stream of the proceedings that you can listen to (in Italian) at

3/ A reminder that the Nigerian Republic is taking part as a civil party to the case: the victim of the alleged crime. They have been able to cross examine throughout, brought their own expert witnesses and will likely ask for a multi-billion dollar damages amount.

4/ Luca Lucia, the Milan lawyer acting for Nigeria will make the concluding arguments. He says he will concentrate on documents showing the bank transfers, company records, Shell and Eni emails and with some references to Shell witnesses' statements

5/ Nigeria's lawyer reminds the court that the @EFCC
has also investigated the OPL 245 case, their officer Ibrahim Ahmed gave evidence on their investigations, charges have also be laid and there are ongoing trials in Nigeria.

6/ Nigeria's advocate lays out the money flows from the $1.1bn Shell and Eni to JP Morgan in London, the failed transfers to Switzerland and Lebanon and the eventual $800m transfer to accounts in Nigeria operated by Dan Etete, Nigeria's former oil minister (also a defendant)

7/ Lucia, Nigeria's lawyer explains how the $800m in Nigeria filtered through to Rocky Top Resources, an Etete company and 4 other companies controlled by Aliyu Abubakar who then moved hundreds of millions of dollars into cash through bureau de changes in Nigeria.

8/ Lucia explains that this evidence came from investigations by the Italian financial police, EFCC and FBI prompted by media reports from @Global_Witness and @Recommon. 4 witnesses from the bureau de changes confirmed details as did Aliyu's employee and nominee director Bashir.

9/ Nigeria's case is then that money reached a Nigerian senator, $10m went to a former Attorney General Bayo Ojo and then serving Attorney General Mohamed Adoke, who receives a mortgage to buy a property from a Aliyu Abubakar linked company.

10/ Lucia explains that Adoke's mortgage is then belatedly repaid from a bureau de change in cash transfers, and $2m makes it to Adoke's account.

11/ Lucia for Nigeria argues that these transfers are notable because Adoke has no reason to receive this money. When Adoke had UK police officer Jonathan Benton brought to his office, Adoke told him the decision not to investigate came from the President. https://twitter.com/pace_nik/status/1047453982745153536

12/ Lucia moves on role of public officials in the contracts between Eni, Shell, Malabu (the company owned by former oil minister Dan Etete) and the Nigerian government.

13/ Lucia explains that when Goodluck Jonathan government was appointed in June 2010, Jonathan together with Adoke and the oil minister Alison-Madueke confirmed Malabu's control of OPL 245 in a letter.

14/ Lucia explains how Malabu also received an extension to pay the long overdue $210m signature bonus. Shell's staff members on the ground, the former MI6 agents Coplestone and Colegate thought in 2009 that Etete's closeness to Jonathan would help him.

15/ Lucia (Nigeria's lawyer) says that it is clear that Nigeria's ministers Goodluck Jonathan, Diezani Alison Madueke and Mohamed Adoke were motivated by personal interest. General Gusau, the former defence minister and National Security Advisor also plays a role in negotiations.

16/ Lucia outlines that Adoke and Alison Madueke were the signatories to the final contracts, but Adoke's role was crucial as he agreed key clauses in the contracts and pushed back on objections from civil servants.

17/ Lucia explains that Adoke also played a key role in setting the final deal price and intervening on how much a middleman connected to Eni (Emeka Obi) could ask for as a commission.

18/ Lucia explains that separate negotiations were happening between Shell and Eni and between the companies, Adoke and Etete on the price. Etete wanted over $2bn, but the companies agreed to pay $1.3bn, Eni's executives noted that there effectively was no negotiation on price.

19/ Lucia explains that beyond the price the terms of the contracts, which last 30 years are very important. Adoke pushes back on Nigeria's technical experts rather than protect Nigeria's national interests.

20/ Lucia describes how Eni and Shell took a huge reputational risk in dealing with Dan Etete, a convicted money launderer, and his company Malabu Oil and Gas, a company who's record couldn't be found and who they never completed due diligence on.

21/ Lucia outlines that the companies knew the problems but they also saw the value of OPL 245 vs the amount they might pay for it. The topic was closely covered by expert witnesses which Lucia will now cover, focussing on the criteria used to assess the value.

22/ Lucia explains that the experts differed on their assessment of how to discount the value, reserve assessments, back in rights and the value of associated gas but that Eni's and the FRN's experts come out aligned on other issues and get to valuations of $4.5bn and $3.5bn.

23/ Lucia explains that Eni's expert added a heavy discount, due to country risk and other factors, arguing that the $1.3 bn total paid is fine.

24/ Lucia says that Shell's expert also questionably used third-party data to assess the value of block, whereas Nigeria's expert used Shell's own data that was disclosed in their email at the time of the deal. Shell's internal assessment was also valuing the block at $3.5bn

25/ Lucia argues that a gap between the value of an asset and the price paid is normal, but it is not normally so wide. In this case the deal is tainted as the license was stolen and Malabu was unable to develop the block and so had to sell with the help of friends in power.

26/ Nigeria argues that the companies of course wanted favourable terms so they dealt with the government decision makers who backed them rather than technical experts from within the government. The companies obtained a very favourable deal against the interest of the country.

27/ Lucia points out that Ednan Agaev, the middleman, said that he was told by a Shell executive that the value could easily go up to $3bn. That matched Shell's assessments for pending litigation. It also now matches the assessment by the FRN's expert.

28/ Lucia argues that this difference between the price paid and what the company's saw the value being was vast. He says the data Eni has presented in court differs from that shown to their own board at the time of the deal and says their witness' arguments aren't credible.

29/ Lucia points to both Shell and Eni experts who played down any value from gas produced alongside oil that could be drilled saying it had no value but internal Shell and Eni documents show they discussed recording additional value from gas reserves in OPL 245.

30/ The live stream seems to have shifted - you can continue to listen (with many thanks to @Recommon and @irpinvestigates) at

31/ Nigeria's advocate Luca Lucia, now runs through the lack of any tender process on OPL 245, except in 2001 when Shell offered a $210m signature bonus, that just was carried over in 2011.

32/ Lucia argues that while the Oil minister does have some discretionary power the law cannot be ignored. Shell and Eni also lobbied hard on issues like back-in rights and a stabilisation clauses because their saw them as valuable and important in avoiding tax bills.

33/ Nigeria's lawyers argues that Nigeria's Attorney General at the time, Mohamed Adoke, accepted all the companies' conditions and deflected objections from civil servants at the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR).

34/ Lucia says that Adoke managed all the meetings with the companies and when the NNPC raised some issues in negotiations in February 2011 Shell emails say that Etete spoke with Goodluck Jonathan and the NNPC issue was solved.

35/ Lucia points out the letter sent by the most senior civil servant in Nigeria's Department for Petroleum Resources in April 2011, just before the deal was signed calling the deal "highly prejudicial" to Nigeria's interest. Again Adoke deals with it and few changes are made.

36/ Lucia points out that later Adoke intervenes to help release funds from the JP Morgan account to Malabu. The bank wrote to the Finance minister but it was Adoke who replied the same day. It was Adoke who was on top of the deal and who dealt with President Jonathan.

37/ Lucia says that the oil minister Diezani Alison Madueke also signed the April 2011 contracts and sent a letter to the companies in May 2011 confirming the fiscal terms that applied to the deal.

38/ Nigeria's lawyer Lucia says that there is clear evidence of Shell executives' knowledge that public officials would receive OPL 245 money.

39/ Lucia says it was clear everyone involved knew that Dan Etete, Nigeria's former oil minister, was behind Malabu Oil. The companies then paying the Nigerian government to fix a dispute with Malabu was unusual, as was the way Eni dealt with the middleman Obi and Etete.

40/ Lucia says the way Eni treated their own board members, Luigi Zingales and Karina Litvack was also bizarre.

41/ Lucia describes how the final witness was also strange, an agent of Nigeria's secret services who said one thing in writing then came to court only to backtrack on his statements.

42/ Lucia asks if it is legitimate to pay a company if you are aware that money will ultimately go to public officials and you receive illicit benefits? A more normal approach would have been to ask for the OPL 245 to be revoked over Malabu's failure to pay the signature bonus.

43/ Lucia says that Nigeria's Attorney General Adoke was aware of this, its why he gave Malabu extensions to pay the long overdue signature bonus. Revoking and the reassigning the license would have been the more logical approach that the Nigerian government could have followed.

44/ Lucia, Nigeria's advocate, says that all the prosecution's evidence converges on confirming the responsibility of the accused defendants in the OPL 245 deal. Hence there is a need to define the damages that Nigeria should therefore receive.

45/ Lucia says that the lack of any tender denied Nigeria the opportunity to find the value of the license. The experts pointed out upfront prices paid in other deals, but there is a missing part, what Nigeria usually makes from a production sharing contract and NNPC's stake.

46/ Lucia says that the NNPC is absent from the block and Nigeria stands to receive no share of "profit oil" in the deal, Nigeria's expert explained the differences between the 2003 deal Shell had on OPL 245 with NNPC, standard Nigeria terms from 2005 onwards and the 2011 deal.

47/ Lucia points out that Nigeria's expert also refers to Resources for Development's study which found missing profits for Nigeria vs the 2003 Shell deal of around $4.5bn and vs 2005 terms of $5.8bn. The damage to Nigeria is therefore massive.

48/ Lucia says that he can only request a provisional amount for damages, a civil court could set the final amount in the event of a conviction.

49/ Lucia argues that Shell and Eni's illicit profits from the OPL 245 deal are certainly higher than the $1.1bn they paid and the harm to Nigeria is also certainly higher, but for now Nigeria asks that $1.1bn is set as the minimum benefit the companies received.

50/ Nigeria therefore asks to receive a minimum of $1.1bn in damages from Shell, Eni and the other defendants if convicted for their role in the OPL 245 deal. In addition the UN Convention Against Corruption allows to assets to be returned to Nigeria by Italy.

51/ That's the end of today's hearing. The next hearing will be on the 21st of September with concluding arguments from Vincenzo Armanna, one of the defendants, a former Eni lawyer who gave evidence against his former colleagues.

52/ Many thanks again to @Recommon for their massive help in reporting today indeed the entire case and @irpinvestigates as well for also arranging the live stream of the proceedings.

53/ Finally for more background on the case check out the Global Witness website and especially on the terms of the OPL 245 deal for Nigeria see our report Take the Future. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/take-the-future/