A quick thread with some of my thoughts on how we might understand what is going on in Belarus I provided today on a #flashpoint panel at @umichWCED

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Lukashenka's regime in Belarus was consolidated after his election in 1994 (which was competitive), and particularly after 1996 when he won his standoff with the legislature and supreme court

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Luka's regime is considered highly personalized. He does not rule through a party, he is not a high ranking member of the military, and the path to political office runs through his network

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It is also a long-lasting regime. As of today, it has been in power some 26 years. This is roughly double the median for modern autocracies

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Prospects for regime survival: it is really difficult to overthrow dictators by mass protests if the security forces remain loyal. When security forces do bring down a regime, they: a) defect, b) refuse to repress, or c) remove the autocrat

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(photo: Intex-Press. by)

Unlikely in Belarus we will see option c by the regular military (coups extremely rare), but we might see a refusal to use massive violence (while repression has been severe, it has not involved shooting mass demonstrations) or more high level defections

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Is Russia going to intervene? Probably not (but maybe). Putin waited to see if Luka would survive, has now offered support (econ., diplo., mil.) This has emboldened regime, but if Luka goes down anyway, unlike to see this reversed via intervention

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(photo: РБК)

Why not? Different geopolitical context to these protests than other mobilizations in the fmr. Sov. Union. More like 2018 Armenia (oppo. not anti-Russia) than 2013-14 Ukraine (pro-EU/anti-Russia more common among protests).

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If Luka goes down, will democracy come? Will want to avoid fate of Sudan. In April 2019, protests helped dislodge the dictator, but the other elites largely stayed in place (with some exceptions)

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Problem is that if oppo agrees to power sharing/negotiated transition, regime insiders have easier time capturing this process than the fragmented oppo that must credibly threaten to bring people back to the streets as leverage to get reforms

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To sum up: dislodging Lukashenka may be easier than dislodging his network

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