THREAD. Chinese customs data is out. It shows that ![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
trade is gradually going back to pre-COVID levels. Key driver for Sino-Russian economic relationship in the near&mid-term will be politics rather than markets: fallout of @navalny's poisoning, crisis over #Belarus, US-China.
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
2/ China's Customs has released its August data. ![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
trade in Jan-Aug was $68.63b, -3.2% compared to 2019. Decline in trade is slowing down (in Jan-Jul it was -4.5%), and trade volumes are growing for a second month in a row: +4.2% in Jul, +4.1% in Aug. http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/302274/302275/3272381/index.html
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
3/ Key factor of growth is rise in
imports from
for the fifth month in a row. In Aug alone it added 17.8% ($5.23b). This is a reflection of a far better state of
economy than many have feared in spring, as @AndrianovaAnna explains in @business https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-08/russia-s-economy-doing-better-in-pandemic-than-many-feared?sref=QmOxnLFz
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
4/ There is also a remarkable August drop in
imports from
(-8.1% in Aug to $4.54b). It's a reflection of China's decreasing imports of oil, as
reserves now are full following a buying spree in spring when Beijing was capitalizing on ![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
price war.
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von Saudi-Arabien 🇸🇦](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f8-1f1e6.png)
5/ Other factors include
teapot refineries (active users of
crude in 2020) using up their import quotas + China ramping up oil purchases from the U.S. before Nov elections in an attempt to please @realDonaldTrump https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-01/china-s-record-oil-imports-slowing-as-teapots-run-out-of-quotas?sref=QmOxnLFz
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
6/ There's still a lot of unpredictability in the global economy, but if the market conditions remain largely intact, we might expect ![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
trade to reach nearly pre-Covid level of $108-110b, according to Sergey Tsyplakov (former
traderep in
, now with @vebrf).
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
7/ The future of ![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
economic relationship will be partially driven by the markets, speed of recovery in both countries, and protracted
market access issues that are now a priority for @GovernmentRF (this @business story provides a good case https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-02/wheat-king-russia-is-missing-out-on-china-s-buying-spree?sref=QmOxnLFz)...
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
8/ ... but what appears to be more important for ![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
cooperation now is politics, namely toxic clouds in relations between Russia & the West, as well as between China & the U.S.+EU. (the later angle is well covered by many great colleagues, so I won't waste your time on it).
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
9/ There were indications that
won't be able to fully use ![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
rift to its advantage because of the protracted conflict with the U.S. Yet Moscow has tried to improve relations with EU, particularly
&
. See excellent explainer by @DmitriTrenin: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81702
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge der Vereinigten Staaten 🇺🇸](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1fa-1f1f8.png)
![Flagge von Frankreich 🇫🇷](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1eb-1f1f7.png)
![Flagge von Deutschland 🇩🇪](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e9-1f1ea.png)
10/ This opening to Europe, coupled with outreach to
&
in Asia, was meant to balance Russia's external partnerships and help Moscow to avoid growing one-sided dependency on China. Don't get me wrong: nobody in the Kremlin wants less economic and security ties with China...
![Flagge von Japan 🇯🇵](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1ef-1f1f5.png)
![Flagge von Indien 🇮🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1ee-1f1f3.png)
11/ ... but multiple senior officials agree that in the long run one-sided and increasingly asymmetric dependency on China doesn't serve Russia's national interests, and that Moscow should try to engage other great powers - even if mending ties with the U.S. will not happen soon.
12/ Now there is a toxic combination of factors that may ruin those hopes - and most of these factors are of Russia's own making. The most serious one appears to be @navalny's poisoning, and possible impact on the Kremlin's ties with @AngelaMerkeICDU, @EmmanuelMacron &
![Flagge der Europäischen Union 🇪🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1ea-1f1fa.png)
13/ Then there is #Belarus, and a huge temptation to use colossal
leverage to force embattled Lukashenka for deeper integration between Russia&Belarus - something that might provoke a strong Western policy response, and kill any opportunity for reengagement.
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
14/ Hopes on
abilities to build useful partnerships in Asia have been more elusive from the start, but @AbeShinzo's departure and @narendramodi's rift with
(+
problems with COVID) may make Russia even more reliant on one external partner - China.
![Flagge von Russland 🇷🇺](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1f7-1f1fa.png)
![Flagge von China 🇨🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1e8-1f1f3.png)
![Flagge von Indien 🇮🇳](https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/72x72/1f1ee-1f1f3.png)
15/ Poisoning of @navalny is the most acute and pressing issue, as my colleague @baunov explains (although Belarus crisis, depending on future Russian actions, might be more impactful): https://carnegie.ru/commentary/82665
16/ As a result, China might by accident find itself in a beneficial position to nudge Russia even further into #PaxSinica - just as the self-made disaster that was the Kremlin's Ukraine policy in 2013-2014 has pushed Moscow into Beijing's arms far more than anybody has expected.
17/ Final point. We don't know yet, what exactly happened to @Navalny and who did it. We don't know, what Putin's game plan for integration with Belarus is, and how much Western reaction is accounted for...
18/ What we know, is that when decisions on these issues will be discussed in the Kremlin, key people in the situation room will be direct beneficiaries from Russia's growing isolation. And some of them simultaneously are beneficiaries from expanded partnership with China. END