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While I know no one is physically going to libraries, I'm still very pleased that this article on election manipulation and protest is officially in print in @govandopp. Quick 
below, and free access here: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/methods-of-election-manipulation-and-the-likelihood-of-postelection-protest/CD08A891E3804C45D28F31E07828AD00/share/cfa67c5fe91d28d7e9fd35d99edacc156f44ee80
below, and free access here: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/methods-of-election-manipulation-and-the-likelihood-of-postelection-protest/CD08A891E3804C45D28F31E07828AD00/share/cfa67c5fe91d28d7e9fd35d99edacc156f44ee80
My coauther @PaulaMukherjee and I tackle one of the biggest puzzles (in my view) in the study of election manipulation: why is post-election protest so rare, relative to the widespread use of manipulation?
We draw on data from NELDA ( @dshyde @nikolayvmarinov; https://nelda.co/ ) and DIEM ( https://sites.duke.edu/kelley/the-project/) to study how manipulation type affects protest risk.
We show that the type of manipulation governments use is important. When fraud (falsification) is used in isolation, protest is significantly more likely to occur. When parties use extra-legal mobilization (like vote-buying or pressure), the risk of protest goes down.
We argue this effect is due to information signaling, following @AlbertoSimpser--mobilization communicates strength. But the result also opens the way to further research on how people perceive different kinds of manipulation.
