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A few months ago we came across an interesting memo in the Corps' archived documents.
Jan 1944, Gen Ridgway (we know you're probably sick of us talking about that guy, but we found this interesting), then the commander of the 82nd Airborne, drafted and signed a memo.
A few months ago we came across an interesting memo in the Corps' archived documents.
Jan 1944, Gen Ridgway (we know you're probably sick of us talking about that guy, but we found this interesting), then the commander of the 82nd Airborne, drafted and signed a memo.
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The memo was addressed to Ridgway's old friend Omar Bradley. At the time of the memo, Bradley, who preceded Matthew as commander of the 82nd, was commander of II Corps.
The memo was addressed to Ridgway's old friend Omar Bradley. At the time of the memo, Bradley, who preceded Matthew as commander of the 82nd, was commander of II Corps.
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The memo (I know it's really hard to read here), calls for the creation of a US Airborne Coordinating Agency. Ridgway calls this an "urgent need."
The memo (I know it's really hard to read here), calls for the creation of a US Airborne Coordinating Agency. Ridgway calls this an "urgent need."
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Remember, by this time, the Allies had conducted airborne operations (mostly regimental in size, Husky the most notable), with mostly catastrophic results. The Allied command was planning the airborne insertions in support of Op Neptune (the seaborne D Day assault).
Remember, by this time, the Allies had conducted airborne operations (mostly regimental in size, Husky the most notable), with mostly catastrophic results. The Allied command was planning the airborne insertions in support of Op Neptune (the seaborne D Day assault).
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According to Ridgway's memo, without a coordinating body, "airborne operations will become less effective and more costly." Costly in terms of US paratroopers killed on insertion. This all makes sense, right?
According to Ridgway's memo, without a coordinating body, "airborne operations will become less effective and more costly." Costly in terms of US paratroopers killed on insertion. This all makes sense, right?
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43 years later, July 1987: an 80-year-old General Jim Gavin writes to General Jim Lindsay (at the time the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps). Gavin sends along the 1944 Ridgway memo (at the memo was written, Gavin was Eisenhower's airborne planner for Neptune)
43 years later, July 1987: an 80-year-old General Jim Gavin writes to General Jim Lindsay (at the time the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps). Gavin sends along the 1944 Ridgway memo (at the memo was written, Gavin was Eisenhower's airborne planner for Neptune)
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[It's a little odd that 80-year-old Gavin happens to have that memo from 1944]
![7 of 11:[It's a little odd that 80-year-old Gavin happens to have that memo from 1944]](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ef9GEIxXgAQR7sF.png "7 of 11:[It's a little odd that 80-year-old Gavin happens to have that memo from 1944]")
[It's a little odd that 80-year-old Gavin happens to have that memo from 1944]
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In his 1987 letter to Lindsay (here), Gavin explains that Ridgway's Airborne Coordinating Agency was really an attempt to prevent the Brits from consolidating all Allied troop carrier lift assets (and claiming credit for the impending D Day airborne assaults).
In his 1987 letter to Lindsay (here), Gavin explains that Ridgway's Airborne Coordinating Agency was really an attempt to prevent the Brits from consolidating all Allied troop carrier lift assets (and claiming credit for the impending D Day airborne assaults).
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Ridgway was concerned that if the Brits (Browning and Montgomery in particular) were able to take over all airborne troops & aircraft, the 82nd & 101st would be left out of in the Normandy insertion and American airborne capability would be lost forever.
Ridgway was concerned that if the Brits (Browning and Montgomery in particular) were able to take over all airborne troops & aircraft, the 82nd & 101st would be left out of in the Normandy insertion and American airborne capability would be lost forever.
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So, one final surprise from Gavin's letter: After D Day, Ridgway's "U.S. Airborne Coordinating Agency," became the American higher headquarters for multi-division airborne assaults: the XVIII Airborne Corps.
So, one final surprise from Gavin's letter: After D Day, Ridgway's "U.S. Airborne Coordinating Agency," became the American higher headquarters for multi-division airborne assaults: the XVIII Airborne Corps.
FINAL:
Today, there is no rivalry. We love our British airborne brothers and are sure they will appreciate this anecdote and the memo that has been lost to history.
@kingsbury_ollie @16AirAssltBde @ArmyComd16X @Army_AIB
Today, there is no rivalry. We love our British airborne brothers and are sure they will appreciate this anecdote and the memo that has been lost to history.
@kingsbury_ollie @16AirAssltBde @ArmyComd16X @Army_AIB
