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Winston Churchill remarks on #counterintelligence threats on a report in his personal intelligence dossier - courtesy of GC&CS/ @GCHQ
'This is pretty well-informed stuff, and possibly reaches the enemy through Polish sources in London. We must Beware' 1
Winston Churchill remarks on #counterintelligence threats on a report in his personal intelligence dossier - courtesy of GC&CS/ @GCHQ
'This is pretty well-informed stuff, and possibly reaches the enemy through Polish sources in London. We must Beware' 1
In Dec 1944, the PM examined a dossier compiled by the head of SIS, Stewart Menzies.
The 7 Dec dossier was typical: an Ultra report, Naval Intel, and four ‘BJs’ or ‘Blue Jackets’, foreign cables intercepted and ‘solved’ by the Government Code & Cipher School (today’s @GCHQ) /2
The 7 Dec dossier was typical: an Ultra report, Naval Intel, and four ‘BJs’ or ‘Blue Jackets’, foreign cables intercepted and ‘solved’ by the Government Code & Cipher School (today’s @GCHQ) /2
The four BJs were
1
A cable from the French Post in Moscow, sent two days prior, (during the negotiations that resulted in the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 10 December 1944.)
The sender suggested that de Gaulle was considering visiting Athens on his return from Moscow. /3
1
A cable from the French Post in Moscow, sent two days prior, (during the negotiations that resulted in the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 10 December 1944.)
The sender suggested that de Gaulle was considering visiting Athens on his return from Moscow. /3
Blue Jacket 2
A Greek message about the developing situation in that country. /4
A Greek message about the developing situation in that country. /4
BJ 3
A compilation of Japanese intelligence reports purporting to illuminate high-level Allied military decisions in China.
GC&CS noted that the translated report had been shared with them by G-2 – American Army Signals Intelligence at Arlington Hall, Virginia. /5
A compilation of Japanese intelligence reports purporting to illuminate high-level Allied military decisions in China.
GC&CS noted that the translated report had been shared with them by G-2 – American Army Signals Intelligence at Arlington Hall, Virginia. /5
And Blue Jacket 4
The Press Directive from Berlin to all posts on 1 December 1944.
German information was good: the Big Three were divided over the Polish Question. Churchill’s recent efforts to bring Moscow around had failed. /6
The Press Directive from Berlin to all posts on 1 December 1944.
German information was good: the Big Three were divided over the Polish Question. Churchill’s recent efforts to bring Moscow around had failed. /6
Perhaps most worrisome, the German cable highlights the way that Poland signalled growing discord amongst the Allies.
Would this endanger plans for post-war order?
Nazi diplomats were instructed to drive a wedge through this divide. /7
Would this endanger plans for post-war order?
Nazi diplomats were instructed to drive a wedge through this divide. /7
Churchill was alarmed at the quality of German information.
He warned his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, (and the Ministerial Head of SIS/GC&CS) of the likely (Polish) sources.
And in doing so revealed key parts of his understanding of the report and of wider events. /8
He warned his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, (and the Ministerial Head of SIS/GC&CS) of the likely (Polish) sources.
And in doing so revealed key parts of his understanding of the report and of wider events. /8
For historians, diplomatic Signals Intelligence like this are rich sources.
Even without significant notes Sigint can illuminate the information behind decision-making and the attitudes of policymakers.
Churchill's instructions were followed. The note was passed to Eden by C.
Even without significant notes Sigint can illuminate the information behind decision-making and the attitudes of policymakers.
Churchill's instructions were followed. The note was passed to Eden by C.
