I started working through this list in preparation for our airpower course in January where, surprise, surprise, we'll be focusing more on China. I chose this book first because I borrowed it for free online & because I thought it would be a good general intro & it was 1/ https://twitter.com/Heather_at_ACTS/status/1293953017537069058

I've also gotten a great question on why it isn't on many academics' reading lists. Is it not worth reading? Well, this book provides an overview of Chinese history from the beginning of time...so no one is going to not have problems with some aspect of it. 2/

The process of learning is a journey, so the point is to start somewhere, realize some kind of absolute truth is almost impossible to arrive at with history, and keep refining your knowledge as you go along. That's what keeps things interesting 3/

The old cliche about the more you know, the more you realize you have to learn rings true. And so take this with a grain of salt as I am not a China expert...alas. The book purports to "explain the conceptual way the Chinese think about problems of peace and war & intl order" 4/

This contrasts, he purports, with the "more pragmatic, case by-case American approach" xv I mean, maybe....? I have a hard time buying this statement in an introduction...and I still don't buy it having read the book 5/

He also argues that the US-China relationship has been relatively stable regarding an "essentially cooperative relationship" through 4 gen of leaders and 8 of pres. 6/

Both nations have exceptional cultures. has missionary zeal. is heir of "Middle Kingdom tradition", which graded everyone else below it (xvi) 7/

Prologue begins with 1962 /India border dispute. India claims frontier it had during British rule. China claims border based on imperial China. Mao supposedly reached back to classic China to break stalemate 8/

Peace would result from using "force to 'knock' India back to negotiating table" (1) based on similar ex during Tang Dynasty (618-907). Supposedly no one questioned wisdom of applying these "ancient precedents" to the current situation, but author offers no cites for claim 9/

He insists that there is an "intimate link to its ancient past & classical principles of strategy & statesmanship" 2 although when he gets to his own experience around 1/3 of the way through the book he never really establishes this IMO 10/

One example that he refers to is the idea that the Chinese language is largely unchanged, thus they can continue to read the ancient documents. This example by logic, though, does not receive supplement from actual evidence beyond that of his own interpretation of the present 11/

But the story of is that it has no origin story (unlike ). It just always was...and it has gone through circles of falling apart and then being reunited....which is different from western sense of history as one of continued progress 12/

And until the Industrial Rev China has always been rich. Until 1820 it had 30%+ of world GDP. But it did not seek empire because one can use force to make an empire, but it's a lot harder to sustain it (12). In terms of context, Europe had its world order shaped in part by....13/

need to balance power. , by contrast, "never encountered societies of comparable culture or magnitude," thus est foundation for a very diff view of world order. 16 I don't know whether he's correct or not, but that is something I will be reading for as I go through my list 14/

Thus it did not "export its ideas but let others come to seek them" (17). Meanwhile, it found itself surrounded by many people who were "better armed & more mobile" (18)...so it depended on "rich array of diplo & econ instruments to draw potentially hostile foreigners" into...15/

manageable relationships. The goal was not conquest as it was deterring invasion & preventing barbarians from aligning against it (19). Thus in the 19th c. supposedly China used same phrases it had much earlier to describe arrival of well-armed Eu barbarians (20)16/

So in dealing with pesky , they drew in other Eu nations as well to manipulate "rivalry," using the good ol' 5 baits: nice things, fancy dinners, etc (21). didn't need to control, it just needed a "compliant, divided periphery" (22). When it did get conquered....17/

it rarely fought back because it knew it would end up "assimilat[ing]" the conquerors (21). Then he talks about Sun Tzu. He states "shrew practitioners of Realpolitik & students of a strategic doctrine distinctly diff from strategy & diplomacy that found favor in the west" 18/

Maybe it's just me, but that seems somewhat contradictory, although I do like his claim that learned from "turbulent hist" that "not every problem has a solution" 22. Thus it didn't like gambling on a "single all-or-nothing clash"--rather it went for "patient accumulation..19/

of relative advantage" (22) Then he talks about the game of go. If chess is about "decisive battle," go is about "protracted campaign" thus playing it teaches one "strategic flexibility" 24. As such, strategist should focus less on "analyz[ing] particular situation" & more on 20/

evaluting its rel to "context in which it occurs," a situation that, alas, is never "static." Thus Sun Tzu uses idea of "shi" to describe a "potential energy" of a "developing situation." No wonder annoying PME prof types never shut up about context 30 . & now onto chap 2...21/

Kowtowing & Opium War: Qing Dynasty of Manchu tribes conquered China in 1644 and conquered more, including Mongolia, Tibet & what is now Xianjiang....now China faced new problem of opponent in Europeans that didn't seek to claim mandate of heaven but....33 22/

impose new world order of free trade (vs tribute thus a foreign concept), embassies & diplomacy not based on fealty and kow tows (exception was Russia, which since 1715 had Russian Orthodox mission that became "de facto embassy" 33-35. Re 18th c. Macartney mission, author..23/

states that Macartney had "keen sense of 'Oriental' diplomacy." One wonders here on p 35 if Kissinger has read the classic work on the topic and how it might have shaped his own dealings with China, such https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/05/20/orientalism-then-and-now/ 24/

Macartney brought lots of cool toys like hot air balloons and was confused as to why he got the "meh" reaction he did. also set to work through "delay, circumlocution, & carefully apportioned favors" to delay, delay, delay 51 /25

Meanwhile, China facing devastation and serious internal challenges, including Chinese Christian sect in the south that launches Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), after which population declines by about 60 million 65 26/

Chinese muster some force once Europeans get tired of talking. In response, the Emperor's Summer Palace gets destroyed, an "act still resented in China" today 67. In other words, the ramifications of Opium Wars still linger today. This point, of course, is not orig to author 27/

Now, turns to Russia but it pays huge cost, giving it port of Vladivostok & 350,000 sq miles of Chinese territory 68. It also is getting into conflict with Japan now, which results in ceding Taiwan to it 82. Meanwhile, Czar has est sphere of influence in Manchuria 28/

Thus "strategy of balancing the barbarians had worked to a degree" 83...meanwhile, competing & claims in NE precipitate a war that wins. Even as China links these dev together, author argues that loss precipitates its return focus to Europe, helping speed up WWI 29/

Around page 89 author begins endless application of game of go to strategy as we fast forward to end of WWII, such as arguing that "Chiang's Nationalist forces opted for a strategy of holding cities, while Mao's guerrilla armies based themselves in the countryside"...30/

this is supposedly both using "wei qi [i.e. game of go] strategies of encirclement." If game of go is complex, author never explains how these strategies are complex. He just slaps the go label on things ad nauseum from here on out 31/

Meanwhile, we are on to Mao & his rev thinking---the first time "launches itself into a new world: in structure, a new dynasty; in substance, a new ideology" 90 thus he purposefully sought to destroy traditions & culture on purpose 93 32/

If Confucius liked harmony, Mao liked "upheaval and the class of opposing forces" both at home & abroad 94, & this led to "unprecedented militarization of Chinese life" that reflected his substitute of "ideological militancy & psych perception" for actual phys strength 99 33/

And now Taiwan became a "demand to respect history." 99 Mao also drew on classic "Empty City Strategm" from Romance of 3 Kingdoms 101... to be continued .... 34/