Belarus is one of Beijing's closest partners in Eastern Europe, and an important BRI experiment.

The ongoing crumbling of Lukashenko's regime is a big test for Beijing's stretegic ambitions in the region

Here's a thread on why will not support Lukashenko:

1/

Officially, Xi Jinping was one of the first to congratulate Lukashenko on his latest (rigged) elections victory. It's a nice favor, but Beijing just cannot afford not endorsing an official autocratic partner that is under pressure of street protests, for internal reasons.

2/

The key question here is, however, whether Beijing will use its diplomatic assets and economic muscle to significantly (and not merely symbolically) support Lukashenko

I think the short answer is no. And the long answer is: it all depends on Russia's response

3/

Beijing's immediate and unconditional support is unlikely. China's generally dissatisfied with economic co-up with Belarus, with Lukashenko being picky on what Beijing offers, and China's dream investment hub in Great Stone not materializing. No big economic interest there.

4/

And politically, China considers Belarus (and Ukraine, for that matter) as Russia's sphere of influence, and will accommodate to Moscow's response to Belarus protests, in most of the scenarios: Lukashenko's fragile survival; managed leaderhip transition; a revolution

5/

If Lukashenko survives as a leader, a very weak one, Moscow will most likely use it to push for more integration. Nothing against Beijing's long term interest (Belarus is attractive for China as a gateway to the Russian market anyways,and trans-Eurasian trains will still run)

6/

If China disrupts Moscow's long-awaited integration plans with BY, it will be the greatest hit to Sino-Russian relations in years. And Beijing needs Moscow on a global scene. (Yes, Beijing lent Lukashenko $500m during the last integration talks, but it wasn't a game-changer)

7/

If we witness a managed leadership transition (relieving social pressure, but not underming Moscow's position), Beijing may try to reap some economic benefits from the new situation. But I wouln't expect a flood economic support. Let's make Moscow pay for its new 'project'.

8/

And if Moscow accepts the new leaderhip, I would expect Beijing to end its eternal friendship with Lukashenko too. China had no problem talking with Guaidó when Maduro was in trouble. Transitions are fine, as long as the Chinese debt is repaid (~$3bn in case of Belarus).

9/

Last but not least, we may see the Belarusian protests escalating, and entering a Ukraine-like dynamics - with genuine democratization happening, possibly with anti-Russian sentiment if Moscow intervenes.

An that's a result Beijing will not accept, for two reasons.

10/

The first is obvious - Russia will not accept it. But China is also ideologically opposed to any democratic transitions, as it sees it all through CIA-induced-coup lenses, just like Russia. I remember those China Daily memes about Hongkong, comparing it Ukraine's Maidan.

11/

Similiar to Ukraine, if a conflict breaks out between Belarus and Russia (and - hopefully - the West and Russia, as a consequence), China will at minimum maintain neutrality towards Russia's moves, and freeze ties with Belarus. Possibly with low-profile co-op maintained.

12/

The situation is fluid, so I probably missed some alternative scenarios (that may actually happen). But I hope I shed some light on the Chinese logic in the region, which we study very carefully.

Thanks for reading

13/end

Some more clarifications on my understanding of the 'revolution' scenario that I gave in response to @Shilinabolan questions: https://twitter.com/J_Jakobowski/status/1295315119002525699?s=20